FORUM

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Definitions of Freedom

I. Locke vs. Hobbes

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The root of our beliefs

FREEDOM stands in danger of being talked and written to death in our own day and age. To add one more log to a funeral pyre can hardly matter. Yet such is human nature that it continues to wrestle with insoluble problems and sometimes arrives at a very acceptable compromise. Such is the case of the concepts of freedom, the single genuine European political contribution. It was in the minds of Greek thinkers that the searching quest for a definition of *eleutheria* (liberty) first arose. From its very inception, the word embraced two meanings, one religious, the other secular. Homer had already denied the existence of absolute freedom even for the gods themselves. Father Zeus, in trying to decide which of two heroes would die in a Greek-Trojan battle, had no freedom of choice. He had to bow to Fate, announcing its decision by the scales in which he weighed the lot of the two protagonists. Thus Fate ruled the Homeric gods, and thus it must certainly rule mere man as well.

The more rationalistic the Greek world became, the more scientific its bent, the greater became the emphasis upon immutable, cosmic "natural" laws to which all things, including mortal men, must bow. The full development of this *Weltanschauung* came through the uncompromising philosophical doctrine of Stoicism after 300 B.C. Its founder, Zeno, deeply inspired by Asiatic influences, firmly established Fate, the monstrous divinity of all natural science, on the throne. Stoicism's faithful ally, astrology, simultaneously preached the complete predestination of all human activities by astral forces permeating the universe. The freedom of the Stoic was, therefore, reduced to acting his part on earth with dignity and decency, abandoning the delusion of free will. The diary of the emperor Marcus Aurelius (d. 180 A.D.) furnishes a fine example of this creed's impact upon a noble though not great mind. The final philosophical interpretation of transcendental freedom in the days of Greece and Rome was in short the blending of certain Asiatic religious ideas with Greek rationalism. It was a coherent philosophical creed attuned to an age of reason.

The dreary stranglehold of this scientific *Weltanschauung* was broken at last through an oriental religion, Christianity. After some hesitation, the overwhelming majority of the

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fathers of the church took up the cudgels in the great battle against determinism, nay, against Fate herself. Essay after essay, invective after invective, argument after argument was launched against the doctrine of fate. The freedom of the human spirit (for the orthodox Christian at least) became axiomatic. For without such freedom how could an evildoer be punished by a God who had foredoomed him to do wrong? Nor would Fate be compatible with divine omnipotence. God must remain able to change his mind at will at any moment. Hence, foreordained, inexorable, and immutable laws of fate (or nature!) would contradict the theory of divine omnipotence. The closest orthodox approach to determinism is found in Augustine's view of predestination (c. 400 A.D.), consequently revived by Calvin in the sixteenth century.

Original sin was the only inevitable lot of all men, but God himself had given man the boon of free will, because he had created him in his own image, and that certainly included the granting of free will. With the triumph of Christianity in the Roman empire the Greek doctrine of determinism was replaced with the belief in man's ability to be the captain of his soul and the master of his fate.

Far more pronounced, however, than in the realm of religious-philosophical speculation was the Greek contribution to the evolution of secular liberty in theory as well as practice. Shaking off monarchic government almost completely between 800 and 500 B.C., the new-born republics of Greece, be they master-racish like Sparta, democratic like Athens, or oligarchic plutocracies like Corinth recognized definite gradations of secular freedom. The sanctity of private property might, for instance, be guaranteed a citizen, although the franchise was withheld from him. He might have the right to vote for certain officials, without being able to run for that office himself—this being the case in Athens in the time of Solon (594 B.C.) with regard to the chief-executive office of *archon*. In short, a very complex welter of interlocking political and economic freedoms characterized the world of rising Greek city-states, until (c. 461 B.C.) Pericles establishes a maximum of political and economic liberties for Athenian citizens. Religious freedom, however, was still denied even the citizens of democratic Athens at the height of her development.

When philosophical analysis by the end of the fifth century began to probe into the theoretical aspects of secular liberty, one general assumption came to be made. Freedom from arbitrary government, which for the Greeks was almost synonymous with monarchic government, i. e., a freedom along the lines of the English Bill of Rights of 1689, was the realized ideal of the great majority of Greeks by the fourth century. It existed (always excluding religious freedom) in most Greek city-states by the middle of that century. Yet constitutional theory and political practice were often at loggerheads. The trial and conviction of the Athenian admirals in 406 B.C., for instance, was achieved by democratic processes yet with supreme disregard for the safeguards inherent in a separation of government powers.

Some elements of such a separation are noticeable in certain Greek constitutions but a conscious attempt in this direction was hardly ever made. In Greece, as well as in Republican Rome, assemblies and senates exercised the bulk of legislative and judicial functions, and often a large part of executive ones as well.

Nor was the economic freedom of the citizen unconditional even in the most advanced Greek states. Slavery as the penalty for unpaid debts began to disappear in the sixth century B.C., but in a large number of city-states the franchise was tied to a minimum of economic assets. Even in democratic Athens we find futile attempts in 411 and 404 to go back to a franchise founded on economic considerations.

Yet the Greeks were so far from the general acceptance of inalienable rights that prisoners of war were still considered slaves, unless or until ransomed by their home government. Nevertheless at least non-combatants in conquered Greek cities in the early fourth century no longer were automatically enslaved. The cry of horror which arose when Philip of Macedon (d. 336 B.C.) reintroduced this savage custom attested the civilized opinion of the Greeks on this matter.

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The institution of slavery itself came in for increasing criticism, but not until the rise of Stoicism did the view that all men were born equal crystallize into clear and direct theory. That actually on earth some men were slaves and some were freemen was due to Fate, not—as even Aristotle had assumed—to some inborn inferiority of the slave. Decent treatment of slaves as of one's human brothers was, therefore, the moral precept of Stoicism. Only very radical Greek writers, among them Euhemeros and Jambulos (c. 300 B.C.), went so far as to advocate equalitarian societies in which not only all men were free and equal, but all were also endowed with certain inalienable rights.

Aristotle's sober skepticism about the feasibility of economic communism did not deter these writers of utopias, and the actual historical influence of their radical ideas remained slight. In one particular only did the Stoic-sponsored view of human equality gradually prevail: in the recognition of the inalienable right to life. There Roman law presents a fascinating evolution. Finally the life of even the slave, as well as that of the helpless infant, was guarded with the full majesty of the law. Christianity in this respect faced *fait accompli* by earlier (pagan) centuries but added to its religious, moral backing. Christianity tended to frown upon slavery, until the Renaissance brought about, at least in the rising colonial empires of Europe, an atavistic revival of this almost extinct institution.

On the whole, we may say that the inalienable rights of life and liberty were at least theoretically fully recognized during the erroneously-called "dark ages." As in antiquity (with the exception of three-hundred years of Roman imperial rule), freedom of worship in the middle ages was still excluded from the inalienable rights. Heterodoxy was heresy and was ruthlessly combatted by an elaborate institution called the "Inquisition." The pursuit of economic happiness, on the other hand, which capitalist Greece and Rome had accorded to every freeman, underwent sharp restrictions in medieval times. With the triumph of feudalism, the right to all but ecclesiastical property reverted legally to the king. All others held land at the will of their lords for specific services to be rendered. Neither peasant nor duke "owned" his house and lands in the modern sense. The freezing of the diverse social strata—peasant, burgher, noblemen—obviated political, as well as economic equality of opportunity. The pursuit of happiness was, therefore, chiefly confined to other than purely economic advancement (which except for the burgher was at best slow, if not improbable). Not wealth, but religion, food, drink, and, of course, sex were the main outlets of feudal man's pursuit of happiness.

From such foundations stemmed the modern evolution of the concept of liberty. The Renaissance reintroduced the republican city-state and the widespread knowledge of ancient concepts of liberty. Outside Italy, however, the political mold of Europe was still the large or at least largish monarchic state, establishing royal absolutism while retaining the bulk of its feudal social and economic institutions. To whittle down monarchic power became the chief aim of all true friends of a more equalitarian spread of political liberty among hypothetically all citizens of the realm, a novel creed whose potentialities Shaw has some English noblemen discuss very amusingly in his *Saint Joan*.

The rising burgher class of western Europe, at least for a long time, refused extension of political rights to the peasants, but became increasingly eager to claim a share in it for themselves at the expense of both the great feudal lords and the royal power itself. The country in which these currents first came to the surface with impressive strength was seventeenth-century England. A widespread demand for religious toleration (chiefly of Protestant sects) added particular zest to the general attack against the bastions of the old order. To this age belonged the two men, Hobbes and Locke, whose views on secular liberty were based on judicious re-evaluation of ancient theories and new realities.

II

Hobbes is unpopular in democratic literature. This is a pity. For his very profound

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views have exercised a lasting influence upon all subsequent European political views on liberty. Born in 1588, the year when Philip's great armada tried to bring England under absolutist (and Catholic) control, Hobbes had his intellectual roots firmly in the northern Renaissance. This is very apparent in his attempts to formulate a purely rationalistic concept of the nature of organized society. We must remember, too, he was greatly devoted to the natural sciences, especially to mathematics. As a contemporary of Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Pascal, and even Newton (he lived to the age of 91!) he shared in the great enthusiasm of his century which established the foundations of modern science as we know it. Applying scientific principles to the vivisection of human society and its problems, he found himself as isolated as any rationalist would be in a world agog with turgid emotionalism. His defense of absolute government and the pre-eminence of the state over the individual made him unpopular with the English revolutionaries of the seventeenth century. The Stuarts nonetheless came to shun him as a reputed dangerous atheist. In another age or country he would hardly have ended his days by a natural death. Seventeenth century England, though still capable of rising to the bait of popery as a bogyman, at least deserves our respect for not executing or even banishing Hobbes, the man whose views very few people liked and very many abhorred.

This cloud has overhung Hobbes' posthumous fame which to this day is far greater on the continent of Europe than in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Why this should be so will be seen best from a brief account of his concept of human freedom, so greatly opposed to that of Locke and his disciples. As a human being Hobbes, of course, was not free from certain inconsistencies, but his main ideas from his *de cive* to his *Leviathan,* first published in 1651 at the height of Cromwellian power, showed little change. The usual view of Hobbes as a defender of absolutism must be tempered with knowledge derived for example from the fact that his *Behemoth's* publication was prohibited by the Restoration regime, as were new printings of his *Leviathan,* a copy of which cost Pepys no less than twenty-four shillings in 1688. Some pious voices even demanded the burning of the old materialist himself. He had spoken his mind in his *de corpore,* a work in which he blithely claimed to have solved the insoluble problem of squaring the circle.

The fundamental concept of Hobbes concerning liberty was perhaps most clearly expressed in Chapters 14, 15, and 26 of the *Leviathan.* He squarely denied the validity of the inalienable rights of man. Only when in agreement with the laws of the state could natural law prevail. In short, the right to rebellion, recognized even by the medieval church as permissible against god-less rulers, could not be based on inalienable natural law. According to Hobbes (ch. 14):

> Writers commonly call the *jus naturale* . . . . the liberty each man has to use his own power as he wills himself for the preservation of his own nature, that is to say his own life . . . . By liberty it is understood . . . . the absence of all external impediments: which impediments may often take away part of a man's power to do what he would, but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgment and reason shall dictate to him.

Since the war of all against all would be the result of man's insistence upon complete and unabridged liberty, man ought to seek peace first, and only when it is unobtainable, resort to war. Peace, however, between men necessitates the voluntary surrender of a certain amount of freedom, this mutual surrender being a "contract" or "covenant." Covenants including one's abandonment of personal self-defense, however, are void, even Hobbes admitted, a theory now deeply imbedded in the United Nations Charter.

Beginning with Chapter 17 of the *Leviathan,* the role of composite society, called the commonwealth, in regard to individual political and economic rights is analysed. Security, incompatible with free reign of individual liberty, is the reason for the founding of states. The commonwealth (*civitas*) according to Hobbes is the great *Leviathan* "or rather . . . . that mortal god to which we owe under the immortal God our peace and defence." In our own day, when "peace-loving" has become the only prerequisite of membership in the United Nations organi-

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zation, the task of assuring peace is given that supreme recognition on a supra-national level which Hobbes attached to it on the level of the individual state. Every single individual has to surrender the necessary amount of liberty to the state in exchange for guaranteed security against invasion and other violations of his way of life. "And he that carries this (legally created) person is called the sovereign; and every one besides his subject." Thus the political commonwealth has come into existence.

In a lengthy discussion of these "sovereigns by institution," Hobbes states that once the original covenant is established the subjects cannot change the form of government; minorities cannot lawfully oppose the majority-supported government. The sovereign's actions cannot be punished by the subject. One of the most timely reminders of Hobbes is his insistence that the sovereign is sole judge of what doctrines are fit to be taught the subjects. Almost equally and ominously modern rings his claim that the power and the honor of the subject vanishes in the presence of the sovereign power. One wonders what liberty there actually remains to the individual after such sweeping grants of power to the government (irrespective of its particular form.)

The first blow to the general concept of political freedom is driven home by the assertion that "it is an easy thing for men to be deceived by the specious name of liberty." Greek and Latin authors are duly accused by Hobbes of fostering misconceptions about individual freedom. The chief reservoir of individual freedom, according to Hobbes, is the silence of the laws laid down by the government. Strangely enough, however, subjects are acknowledged to possess the right of physical self-defense even against the lawfully dispatched agents of the government. To shoot it out with the Gestapo, the NKVD, or—heaven forbid—the F.B.I. would therefore be lawful, although suicidal, for Hobbes' subject. The power of the sovereign under all circumstances remains unlimited, however, and is even in such cases challenged by the subject only at his own peril.

In a single brief chapter (24) Hobbes discusses the economic relationship between the state and the individual. It may shock twentieth century advocates of high tariff self-sufficiency to hear from Hobbes that "there is no territory under the dominion of one commonwealth . . . . that produces all things needful for the maintenance and motion of the whole body." Trade, manufacture, and exchange of surplus commodities are to solve the problems created by those deficiencies. The distribution of a state's tangible assets, all property in short, "belongs in all kinds of commonwealths to the sovereign power," a rude contradiction to the vaunted "sanctity of private property" (which even in the most liberal practice has always been infringed by the resplendent power of eminent domain). Hobbes, of course, has no qualms: all private property exists only by explicit or implicit grant from the sovereign. All regulation of foreign trade and commerce is, of course, reserved exclusively to the sovereign. Paradoxically, therefore, it is the sovereign who would decree "free trade" policies, anathema of course in the United States, while urgently recommended by the same United States as a cure-all for the economic ills and woes of all other countries. All in all, therefore, Hobbes also denies that there is any inalienable right to free economic enterprise.

In conclusion, a word may be said about Hobbes' view of colonial relationships with the mother-country. It may come as a pleasant surprise to some that Hobbes clearly recognized the right of colonies to become sovereign, provided, however, that the founding sovereign granted them independence. This had happened in Greek antiquity quite regularly, and Hobbes obviously did not foresee that the then nascent American colonies would claim one day their "inalienable" right to sovereign self-government by force of arms.

There is an ice-cold, uncompromising rationalism about the structure of Hobbes' *Leviathan*. None of the pleasant illusions and delusions which soften man's relations with his rulers, self-chosen or hereditary, tempers his fundamental axiom that *a priori homo homini lupus,* that therefore for the establishment of social peace on a regional scale at least a powerful collective person, the sovereign, must be created. Automatically there-

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after all individual liberty is curtailed by the superior interest of the survival. The only redeeming feature is that to the private citizen "all is allowed which is not expressly forbidden by law."

Of equally grim but inescapable logic are Hobbes' views about the fundamental nonexistence of private property rights. Neither land nor movable property is exempt except by special grant (which in the very nature of such an arrangement will always be a temporary one). The managerial revolution, blatantly described as a novelty of the twentieth century, as well as the totalitarian state of red, black, or brown coloring found its blue-print long ago in Hobbes. Even in its monopoly of indoctrination of its subjects the commonwealth of Hobbes bears the grim features of our modern totalitarian states.

III

The Thirty-Years War was reaching its military climax, the great Kepler was barely a year in his grave, when John Locke, 44 years the junior of Hobbes, was born into the family of a prosperous attorney and landowner August 29, 1632. Like Hobbes he became an Oxford man, but found the dull atmosphere of the famous school as little to his liking as had Hobbes many years before him. From the time he was 8 until he was a mature man of 28, the great English revolution set the pace of life in England. Of Puritan antecedents, Locke could not but have been lastingly affected by the unprecedented changes which shook the political and religious structure of England to the very foundations before his attentive eyes.

With the immortal arsenal of a sound, albeit painfully acquired, classical training behind him, he gradually developed a keen interest in the magnificent scientific progress of his era. Far from being a profound and intellectually ruthless thinker like Hobbes, however, Locke sweetly blended scientific empiricism with philosophical dogmatism. His medical training stood him in good stead in providing practical insight into the difficulties in the path of both pure empiricism and uncompromising theory. An *Essay Concerning Toleration* (1666) applied his basic reasonableness to the thorny religious question of that age. Time and again he reverted to this topic, without, however, greatly changing his original views. The combination of scientific and theological interests led him inevitably towards philosophical expression of his attitude. His principal contribution in this field was the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* which was published in 1690, soon after his return to England not long after the Glorious Revolution of 1688.

His liberal political views, no less partisan in their origins than those of the royalist Hobbes, received their decisive form during the years of his Dutch exile when his efforts were directed towards advocating William of Orange's accession to the throne of England. This meant, of course, the development of an anti-Stuart, anti-absolutist social and political philosophy. His *Treatises on Government*, together with his *Letters on Toleration*, became the embodiment of Locke's ideas on these subjects. Although he firmly objected to Hobbes' thesis that indoctrination of the subject is a state monopoly, he still was far from advocating complete religious freedom. Since "the taking away of God dissolves all," atheists put themselves outside the pale and were therefore refused any claim to toleration. Worse still, Roman Catholics in England, because they owed allegiance to a foreign sovereign, should not receive unconditional toleration.

Locke's argument concerning the Catholics has been reiterated time and again by twentieth century totalitarian governments, especially those seated in Berlin and Moscow, and more recently by Moscow's puppets in Budapest and Prague. Stripping Locke's views on religious freedom of all excess verbiage, they amount to advocacy of complete toleration for Protestant sects only, a somewhat arbitrary limitation *ad hoc* of the general principle of religious toleration, a limitation based on purely English conditions at the end of the sixteenth century, and therefore devoid of general philosophical validity. For this reason it is impossible to see in Locke an advocate of complete religious freedom. At best one might credit him with opposing a state church, i. e., a government-dictated religious monopoly.

While Locke thus favored at least limited religious freedom against Hobbes' uncom-

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promising insistence on the state's right to prescribe a doctrine for all its subjects, he also opposed Hobbes' views on the nature of the "original covenant" and the nature of property rights. He too assumed a basic covenant on which all government rested, but contrary to Hobbes such a contract was revokable, whenever the government broke its side of the bargain. Moreover changing circumstances could lead the people to amend or otherwise alter the basic covenant. This in itself meant the assumption of inalienable *individual* rights which, even if men in a moment of fear or weakness transferred them upon a government, actually remained with the individuals.

The difference between Locke's and Hobbes' views on the nature of the state is therefore fundamental. For Hobbes considered the evolution of organized government a natural development in man's effort to obtain individual security through limitation of his individual liberty of action. As a natural process, the growth of states was irreversible (like the second law of thermodynamics), therefore the individuals had no right subsequently to rebel against the sovereign or demand as a matter of right changes in the existing government.

Hobbes' static state—Stalin calls it monolithic—however, would never be realizable in a fluctuating world of living men and immortal ideas. Locke's flexible government was thus a concept far better suited to a dynamic age of incessant social, economic, and political changes. It gained great influence in eighteenth century Europe and Europe *outre mer,* i. e., especially in the western hemisphere, where the rebellions of the English and later the Spanish colonies owed much of their ideological weapons to Locke.

Actually, of course, Locke's theory was a clear-cut revival of the Greek concept of inalienable rights. No age that combats monarchic power will fail to develop this axiom of man's eternal right to determine and redetermine if need be his own kind of government. Every era in which absolute government prevails unchallenged will side with Hobbes in adopting the "give unto Caesar what is Caesar's" attitude of passive submission to the state.

The other inalienable right of man, according to Locke, was the right to private property. In it, Locke saw the surest safeguard of the individual against interference with his liberty. He went so far as to see in the protection of private property the very *raison d'être* of the state. Even Locke admitted, however, that originally common property prevailed, but added that by his own labor each individual acquired a vested share in it, his "private" property. As long as he did not curtail the property rights of others and did not take more than he needed for his upkeep, he was fully entitled to the fruits of his efforts.

It is, therefore, somewhat uncalled for to eulogize (or condemn) Locke as the absolute champion of private property *per se.* For clearly no one under Locke's concept of inalienable property rights has the right to alienate his laboriously acquired wealth to an heir. At death the right to property ends and the estate reverts to the community as a whole. One should remember that this is not necessarily socialist doctrine. For the thoroughly unsocialist caste-state of the feudal ages in its abstract legal concept adopted precisely this view. No feudal dignitary had a *right* to bequeath his fief even to his oldest son. That feudal practice made such transaction eventually dependent upon payment of a tidy sum by the heir to the overlord (who *could* have claimed the whole estate) was a practical compromise between the reality of family affection and abstract feudal property concept. It is not devoid of irony that in raising ever higher death-duties twentieth century England seems to revert rather to Locke's idea of the strictly individual character of all property rights.

Yet Locke himself would have abhorred such a policy. For in his view—illogical though it was—the state should refrain as much as possible from interference in the economic affairs of its citizens, a magnificent theory but one which has rarely been tried and then usually abandoned sooner or later by modern governments. The *Treatises of Civil Government* contain long discussions of the rights of private ownership. Were it not for the negation of state interference, Locke's theory of individual private property

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rights is wide enough to be suitable for socialist and even communist economies. An engineer in a Russian plant "earns" his salary plus rights to use certain property rights that go with his job, like possession of a house for himself and his family, the use of a car perhaps, buying privileges and other economic rights of this kind. All of these lapse at his death or purge, although it seems his savings, deposited in government banks, of course, can be inherited by his family even in Communist Russia.

Locke is not intrinsically at much variance with Hobbes' thesis that all property and other economic assets are basically the state's and only by the state's free will transferred into the hands of private citizens. For Locke, the citizen's own labor is a necessary prerequisite, but on the other hand establishes a mandatory claim to private property. The life of the individual is the term for which such rights are really valid. That means provided the individual in acquiring his property has obeyed the rules he is secure in his holdings for life, according to Locke, but not according to Hobbes, who grants the state power to interfere at any moment. Locke's *salto-mortale* concerning the hereditary succession to property, certainly not earned by one's own labors is perhaps the weakest spot in his armor (though most understandable from the human point of view).

In conclusion we may brutally summarize the outstanding features of the concepts of individual liberty developed by both men. Hobbes recognizes no inalienable rights whatever, once by free covenant the individual has abdicated his freedom for the mess of pottage called "personal security." Locke insists that man cannot barter away permanently certain fundamental rights which thus are inalienable. Amongst these is the right to alter or revoke the original political covenant when circumstances or the government's violation of the moral basis of the covenant warrant such changes. Revolution itself is the last resort but from this perspective legitimate, when all means of peaceful change fail. (How much did the American rebels owe to this convenient doctrine!) Locke's other chief inalienable right is the unconditional right to lawfully acquire property for the life of the owner. In general, state interference with economic activities is sternly frowned upon by Locke. Hobbes, on the other hand, insists that all property is the state's unless specifically or tacitly turned over to the use of individuals. Even then the state can reclaim it at any time. In the last analysis, individual man in the commonwealth of Hobbes is always a subject, in that of Locke a citizen. Small wonder therefore that Locke's concept of liberty has become the more popular one at least for the past two centuries. Yet the shade of Hobbes has walked steadily with that of Locke, and we shall see, how powerfully the old rivals have influenced the changing concepts of liberty from the days of James II to those of our own New Deal.

A lawyer named Strange lay dying, a friend asked him what he would like inscribed on his tombstone.

Just put 'Here Lies an Honest Lawyer'," he said.

"But," said the friend, "that doesn't tell who it is."

"Oh, yes," replied the lawyer, "many a passerby will say: 'That's Strange'."—*—Farmer's Weekly*

"Hey, what are you doing?" yelled the foreman.

"I'm just sharpening a pencil," answered the bricklayer.

"Well, don't let anybody see you. That's a carpenter's job, you know."

—Workmen of the World

The young man had ardently proposed to the broker's daughter, but she could not make up her mind. "Will you be true to me?" she demanded.

"I'll be true as steel," he declared fervently.

"Common or preferred?" she mused.—*Financial Post*

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Soviet-German Collaboration

By PETER VIERECK

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Russia and Germany are old friends

STALIN'S 1939 alliance with Hitler was not an angry short-term reaction to the Western crime of Munich but a calculated, long-term culmination of the secret *Reichswehr*-Soviet military cooperation begun by the Rapallo pact of 1922 and the Berlin treaty of 1926. This cooperation is thoroughly confirmed from such entirely separate sources as the posthumous papers of General von Seeckt, the 1948 memoirs of Ruth Fischer, and others.

In some ways a precursor of Nazi militarism, Seeckt organized the *Reichswehr* rearmament on Soviet soil in the 1920's, which enabled Germany to violate the disarmament provisions of Versailles behind the Iron Curtain. Seeckt planned a joint Soviet-German attack on Poland, such as eventually touched off World War II. His confidential papers were captured with the German Army archives by American troops after the war and are now stored in Washington in the National Archives Building. There they are accessible to historians. Some of the more sensational papers, confirming the above allegations, have been published by Melvin Lasky and Julius Epstein in *Der Monat.*

Ruth Fischer is the sister of Gerhart Eisler, the Kremlin agent who recently fled from the United States. She was General Secretary of the German Communist Party and a member of the Comintern presidium and knew the Soviet leaders, including Stalin, personally. In his preface to her memoirs, Harvard's historian of Germany, Sidney B. Fay, vouches for the general historical validity of her assertions about Soviet-German cooperation, which are confirmed by independent sources.

Insufficiently devoted to Russian nationism, she was forced out of the Communist Party by Moscow's Stalinist faction in 1926. Meanwhile, the rank and file of her fellow German Communists, not to mention Western Communists, were kept in ignorance of the *Reichswehr* alliance. They sincerely believed that Communism was fighting against German "fascist militarism." According to her summary:

> He (Communist Deputy Torgler) said: if our rank and file ever learned of these facts, there would be a mass exodus from the party. . . . . In 1928, there were at least 800 men assigned by the *Reichswehr* Ministry to work with the Red Army. . . . In Leningrad, Perm, Sverdlovsk, and the Ukraine, munition plants were set up and run with expert German assistance. . . . The continued collaboration between the two armies has remained one of the best-kept secrets of contemporary history. In this relationship, we must seek the basic explanation of many factors of both Stalinism and Nazism. . . . After Hitler came to power, Stalin tried incessantly via army channels to get an alliance with Nazi Germany, a policy that reached its fruition finally in August, 1939. . . . Manipulated from Moscow [the German Communist Party] was directed into a policy of silent agreement, not disturbed by name-calling, with the Nazis, and virulent opposition to the Democrats and Social Democrats. . . . The anti-Nazi camp was split down the middle, split by an ax wielded by Stalin.[1]

[1]Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism,* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1948.

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Many motives, often conflicting, must have entered the complicated Soviet purges and treason "trials" of the 1930's. Anti-Semitism may perhaps have been a contributing factor in the denunciations of such Old Bolsheviks as Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev as suggested in the June *Commentary* by Solomon Schwarz and as charged in the 1930's by the *Jewish Daily Forward*. In any case, these trials enabled the nationalistic Soviet bureaucrats to eliminate in advance any internationalist Marxist opposition at home to their wooing of Nazi militarism. As scapegoats Stalin was paradoxically accusing his Old Bolshevik victims of his own unsuccessful pro-German orientation, which at that date was being rebuffed by Hitler.

THE POPULAR FRONT

Stalin's anti-Nazi "Popular Front" policy in the West during the 1930's was not only a wise re-insurance against Hitler's appetite for the Ukraine. It was also a shrewd way of increasing his bargaining power with Hitler by publicly blackmailing him into considering Stalin's private alliance offers during those same 1930's. The greater Stalin's nuisance potential—for example, in slowing up Axis aggressions against Loyalist Spain—the greater the price he could demand from Hitler when their alliance was finally consummated in 1939. As a result, the price successfully exacted by this Janus-faced Soviet *Realpolitik* was high indeed, Hitler being forced not only to share the spoils of Poland but to allow Soviet conquests in the Balkans, the Baltic, and Finland.

The climax of this long Bismarckian tradition of cooperation between German and Russian militarism was reached in their joint conquest of Poland and the Baltic states in 1939 and in Molotov's eloquent speech in the Supreme Soviet:

> One swift blow to Poland, first by the German Army and then by the Red Army, and nothing was left of this ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty. . . . Germany is striving for peace, while Great Britain and France, which only yesterday were declaiming against aggression, are . . . . opposed to the conclusion of peace. . . . There is absolutely no justification for a war . . . . under an ideological flag. . . . One may accept or reject the ideology of Hitlerism as well as any other ideological system; that is a matter of political views. . . . It is, therefore, not only senseless but criminal to wage such a war as the war for "the destruction of Hitlerism," camouflaged as a fight for "democracy." . . . It is the fear of losing world supremacy that dictates to the ruling circles of Great Britain and France the policy of fomenting war against Germany. . . . Today our relations with the German State are based on our friendly relations, on our readiness to support Germany's efforts for peace. . . . We have always held that a strong Germany is an indispensable condition for a durable peace in Europe.

The ripening of this Rapallo spirit was further illustrated in 1939 by Stalin's famous toast ("I know how much the German people loves its Fuehrer; I should like, therefore, to drink to his health"), and by Stalin's telegram to Ribbentrop hailing the cementing of their alliance by Polish blood ("The friendship of the people of Germany and of the Soviet Union, cemented by blood, has all grounds to be prolonged and stable").

SUPPLIES

Meanwhile, the New York *Daily Worker* boasted: "If London and Paris are counting on their blockade and talk of shortage of raw materials in Germany as a means of continuing the imperialist war, the Soviet Union will soon remedy that." The Soviet Union's "remedy" of sending raw materials to Germany was of impressive aid to the Nazi war machine, for which Molotov claimed some of the credit. After the fall of France, he insisted that "the German-Russian agreement had not been without influence upon the great German victories."

The Nazi archives, captured by the American Army, contain a memo to the German Foreign Office from the Nazi expert on trade with Russia. This shows that during the first four months of 1941 Stalin sent Hitler 232,000 tons of petroleum, fuel needed by Nazi bombers and submarines to smash the lone resistance of democratic England. The same important memo praises the Communist authorities for sending the Nazis an unusually large quantity of grain and petroleum during the single month of April, 1941:

> STATE SECRET. SECOND MEMORANDUM ON THE STATUS OF GERMAN-SOVIET TRADE RELATIONS. . . . The

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> status of Soviet raw material deliveries still presents a favorable picture. Of the most items of raw materials, the following deliveries were made in April (1941): Grain 208,000 tons; Petroleum 90,000; Cotton 8,300 tons. . . . Total deliveries in the current year amounted to: Grain 632,000 tons; Petroleum 232,000 tons; Cotton 23,500 tons; Manganese ore 50,000 tons; Phosphates 67,000 tons; Platinum 900 kilograms. . . . The quantities of raw materials now contracted for are being delivered punctually by the Russians, despite the heavy burden this imposes on them.

The irony is that some of these Russian deliveries were to be used against Russia herself, being delivered on the eve of Hitler's surprise attack and at a time when the attack had already been decided on. Nor was the Soviet aid to Hitler only economic. After the two armies, which had built each other up in the 1920's, fulfilled Seeckt's original plan of conquering Poland together, "Stalin provided Hitler with a naval base near Murmansk, where the Nazi commerce raiders were outfitted. Icebreakers from the Communist fatherland cleared the way for the Nazi cruisers across the Arctic Ocean to the Bergen Sea, making possible the very successful German raids on Pacific shipping in 1941."

The argument that Stalin was merely "playing for time" for "the inevitable conflict" was advanced by Soviet apologists *after* Germany's attack. But why needlessly send so much petroleum and other military aid to someone whom you expect to use it against you? The evidence about 1922-40 makes a seriously-intended long-term collaboration (though never without mutual distrust) a more plausible explanation for the behavior of both the Soviet ruling caste and the *Reichswehr* military caste.

Unlike the irrationally aggressive Hitler, both these castes were motivated by a non-ideological *Realpolitik* of material self-interest, as expressed by Molotov in July, 1940: "(Stalin) knew several leading German statesmen well. . . . Stalin was not of the opinion that German military successes menaced the Soviet Union and her friendly relations with Germany. These relations were *not based on transient* circumstances but on the *basic national interests* of both countries."

A leitmotif of these captured Nazi-Soviet documents is that Stalin "personally always advocated a friendly relationship between Germany and the Soviet Union" and "was a convinced adherent of the Axis and an opponent (*Gegner*) of England and America."

But at the same time Germany and Russia both displayed that increasing momentum of expansion which makes peace so difficult with any dynamic totalitarian society. This is more obviously true of the unappeasable Nazi dreams of world conquest. But Russia's urge to expansion also overreached itself in the famous Molotov-Hitler conversations of November, 1940, in Berlin. Here Molotov announced Stalin's demand (unacceptable to Hitler) for control of the Dardenelles and of Bulgaria and Finland, naming this as Communist Russia's price for entering the Nazi-Fascist-Japanese "Tripartite Pact" against the United States and Britain "as a partner." The minutes of the Berlin meeting of November 12 concluded:

> It was a matter (according to Hitler) of opposing any attempt on the part of America to "make money on Europe." The United States had no business either in Europe, in Africa, or in Asia. Molotov expressed his agreement with the statements of the Fuehrer regarding the role of America and England. The participation of Russia in the Tripartite Pact appeared to him entirely acceptable in principle provided that Russia was to cooperate as a partner and not merely as an object. In that case he saw no difficulties in the matter of participation of the Soviet Union in the common effort. . . .

At this point the Hitler-Molotov conversation was unexpectedly broken off because of the possible danger of a sudden "air raid alarm," a dramatic reminder from the West. Next day the negotiations for Russia's Axis membership were resumed. They broke down mainly because of Russian insistence on the Dardenelles and adjacent Bulgaria. This demand, as the captured records make clear, did more than any ideological difference to turn Germany against Russia. Hitler became convinced there was no room for two such expansive empires.

Here is how Ribbentrop summed up the failure of the November negotiations to the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

> Russia would also have joined the Tri-

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> partite Pact (the Nazi-Fascist-Japanese alliance against England and America), but her conditions could not be met. . . . The third condition had as its subject the establishment of bases on the Dardenelles. . . . Germany preferred the Dardenelles to remain in the hands of the Turks. Besides, she could not permit a penetration of the Russians into the Balkans. However, Russia kept trying to push forward in that direction.

Here history repeated itself. The same Dardenelles demand by the Russian Tsar Alexander—provoking Napoleon's comment that "Constantinople is the key to world empire" —helped cause Napoleon to break that earlier pact between two apparently opposite ideologies. It had caused the same surprise in its own day and had the same aftermath in an arrogant invasion of quicksand. In 1941 the Soviet dictator fought Germany not as an anti-fascist but because he had no choice, being attacked. This cost millions of innocent Russian lives that might have been saved if both Chamberlain and Stalin had crushed the unappeasable Nazi barbarism earlier when Winston Churchill warned them.

After Hitler defied *Reichswehr* advice by breaking the Russian alliance in 1941, it was revived without Hitler by the captured *Reichswehr* officers of Stalin's "Free Germany Committee" of 1943 and by some of the high generals in the German anti-Hitler *putsch* of July 20, 1944. Today the alliance lives on in Germany's Russian-directed "Socialist Unity Party," openly recruited from both Communists and former Nazi S.S. men. The popular appeal of this party is, as might be expected, based on "socialism" and on nationalism; also, on occasion, on anti-Semitism, directed against leaders of the German Social Democrats. On June 23, 1948, the Berlin Communists invaded the City Assembly to intimidate it. One of the legislators the Communists beat up was the Socialist leader Jeannette Wolf. The woman whom they struck and whom they mocked as "old Jewess," happens to be a cripple who had spent six years in a Nazi concentration camp, where her family was burned in ovens by such S.S. men as now staff the German Communist Party.

By repudiating the Soviet pact, Hitler was repudiating not only the Russians but the Bismarckian and Rapallo traditions of his own *Reichswehr*. This culminated in Hitler's hanging some of his top generals as pro-Russian after July, 1944. Hitler's betrayal of his relatively loyal Soviet ally was the miracle that saved the West. The West might otherwise have found a German-Russian alliance as unbeatable as the geopolitician Haushofer predicted.

Today the West may still find it so, and sooner than generally realized. The Soviet lifting of the Berlin blockade in May, 1949, may be the first step toward renewing this alliance through an independent centralized German government, unoccupied by Western troops. Such a government, being inevitably nationalistic, would enable the two extremes of Communists and of militarist and monopolist reactionaries to renew their Seeckt-minded pro-eastern coalition against the moderate pro-western middle group of parliamentary capitalists and parliamentary socialists.

A certain Atlanta executive informed his wife that he would have to go to New York on business for a few days, but that he would hurry back to her as soon as possible.

After silent reflection, his wife said, "I think I'll go with you dear."

"But honey, I'm going to be terribly busy every moment I'm there," her husband protested. "You wouldn't enjoy the trip a bit."

"Oh, I'm not going for the enjoyment," the wife explained. "I'm going to buy some clothes."

"You're going all the way to New York for clothes?" hubby exclaimed. "Why, sugar, you can get all the clothes you want right here in Atlanta."

"Oh, thank you, dear," she cried, "That's just what I wanted you to say. I won't have to go to New York after all."—*The Financial Post*

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Stereotypes distort the picture

The Reporters View Germany

By FERDINAND A. HERMENS

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STEREOTYPES have been dealt with brilliantly in Walter Lippmann's book on *Public Opinion*. They are simplified pictures of reality. Simplification is needed, but there is danger of oversimplification, which is particularly grave when emotions take a hand. Stereotypes serve the same purpose as abstractions; both are an economical means of coming to grips with a complex reality. In the process of abstraction, however, we proceed logically and rationally. *All* of the essential features of a term are gathered in a definition. In the case of stereotypes, a part will do. It is the part which our emotions make us expect, and what it lacks in completeness it makes up by inflating the selected characteristics to a point where they may bear little relationship to reality. Once formed, the stereotype becomes a tyrant. As Walter Lippmann reminds us: "For the most part, we do not first see and then define, we define first and see then." He continues: "There is nothing so obdurate to education or criticism as the stereotype. It stamps itself upon the evidence in the very act of securing the evidence. That is why the accounts of returning travelers are often an interesting tale of what the traveler carried abroad on his trip."

The "returning travelers," with whom this article is concerned, are our German correspondents, whose accounts are "returning" to us by way of the daily press. They report in terms of stereotypes, which are clearly made at home, the residue of the official and unofficial propaganda of World War II. Everybody, or nearly everybody, in Germany was identified with the type of the arrogant, treacherous, and sadistic Nazi. Kenesaw Mountain Landis II, evaluating the reports emanating from Germany during the first months after V-E Day, wrote in *The Chicago Sun* (August 20, 1944):

> If a German was found holding his head up, he was denounced as arrogant. If he held it down, he was a whiner. If he smiled, he was trying to undermine our morale. If he held his face straight, he was sullenly plotting revenge. If he attacked Hitler, he was a Nazi in disguise. If he didn't attack Hitler, he was a Nazi without remorse.

Before proceeding, let us guard against the danger of making personal devils out of the reporters just as some of them made personal devils out of nearly every German with whom they came into contact. Reporters are employees bound by instructions. Their employers are in many ways the employees of the public. The modern newspaper, or magazine, with a mass circulation, is extremely sensitive to the type of criticism which might reduce circulation. The burden of fixed costs is heavy. A loss in circulation will do little to reduce costs, but may materially affect revenue, in particular revenue from advertising. Therefore, modern publishers, for the most part, eschew the crusading tactics of a Horace Greeley. They prefer to "play it safe," and bow to "public opinion" as it appears to them in reactions from their reading public. They overlook the difference between "We the People" and "We the Vocal People."

In the case of Germany, the comparatively small number of fanatics for whom the war against the German people began after the war against the German armies had been won, was extremely vocal. As often happens, they

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carried the day against the more tolerant, but passive majority, whose views can, however, be ascertained from the polls taken by the National Opinion Research Center, then located in Denver. (The careful work of this agency must, incidentally, be distinguished from the Gallup polls on Germany, which operated with questions of the "Have you stopped beating your wife?" variety. As a result it produced a "public opinion" to the liking of Mr. Morgenthau and his supporters.)

Post-war reporting from Germany was certainly different from pre-war reporting. Before Pearl Harbor, American correspondents in Berlin knew the country and its language, and it is even now difficult to forget the lucidity, for example, with which Mr. Otto D. Tolischus reported to *The New York Times* on the most complicated schemes of Nazi finance. After the war, the critical newspaper reader had his first surprise when few of the familiar names of the pre-war period reappeared in dispatches from Germany. Mr. Tolischus never resumed his German reporting. Mr. Louis P. Lochner, who as head of the Associated Press in Berlin had earned the Pulitzer Prize for distinguished service as a foreign correspondent, was not allowed to return to his post until after he had accepted a demotion. In the months which followed, his by-line rarely appeared in A.P. newspapers. Eventually, it became difficult not to connect this fact with information, received privately, that certain American organizations received long cables from correspondents in Germany, paid for them as well as for their authors' salaries, and deposited them in their waste paper baskets.

Military Government officials not of the Morgenthau persuasion were the first ones to notice the difference between what was, and what should have been, reported from Germany. They had reasons for resentment, because every time they wanted to take constructive steps they were told that "public opinion" at home did not permit them. Some of these officials have since related their experiences in public. Thus Dr. Marshall Knappen, formerly Chief of the Religious Affairs Section of the Office of Military Government for Germany, in his book, *And Call It Peace,* has this to say when dealing with the handicaps which the minority of correspondents who were willing and able to do a good job, had to face:

> The greatest of these handicaps was the home editorial policy, over which these reporters, of course, had practically no control. They, like ourselves, were men set under authority, and they too received directives from home. When I asked one to try to send back a well-balanced story, he was sympathetic but also realistic. "I have a cable from the home office," he said. "It ends: 'This is the way the German situation looks in New York and we hope it looks the same to you.' What do you expect me to do?" It was widely reported that a prominent correspondent of a large news agency received a cable from his office in New York asking him to recheck his copy in the light of his organization's policy not to start a sympathy campaign for Germany. In other words, the supposedly objective enlighteners of public opinion were given a prescription to which dispatches must conform. It was another example of the problem, as old as Plato, of how to guard the guards.

Subsequently Dr. Knappen, dealing again with the serious correspondents, writes:

> Many of the important stories for which they gathered materials—such as some on the treatment of German prisoners of war and internees in our stockades—they never published, explaining that as yet public opinion back home was not ready for such unpleasant facts.

In this connection it is important to recall —as General Patton recalled in the press conference in which, just before his dismissal from the command of the Third Army, he tried to smooth over his imprudent earlier remarks on denazification—that headlines are an important part of a story, and that they are written at home. So far as the post-war reporting from Germany is concerned, headlines almost invariably lean more strongly in the direction of stereotypes than does the body of the dispatch. For example, *The Chicago Sun* of December 16, 1946, contained an A.P. dispatch, the contents of which are indicated in the first sentence: "A U. S. Army estimate that Russia still holds 3,000,000 Germans as prisoners of war in Russia and satellite countries came to light

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today from the files of the Senate Committee investigating the National Defense Program." The headline reads: "Russia Reported Holding 3 Million Nazis Prisoner." The change of one word was sufficient to make "Nazis," presumably deserving little sympathy, out of all "Germans," mostly draftees, who felt about the war as all draftees did, and were now held by the Russians. This happened at a time when our military leaders were alarmed at the treatment meted out to German P.W.'s after V-E Day (General Eisenhower had expressed himself forcefully on this subject in the fall of 1945). The State Department had also begun to realize the awkwardness of the situation into which it had been placed after the Yalta conference led to the surrender of the entire German Eastern Front to Russia, with the use of the prisoners as forced laborers, without a time limit, plainly intended. (On March 24 of the following year this was to be admitted in the British House of Commons by Mr. Hector McNeill, Minister of State, speaking for the British government.)

Limitations of space preclude a discussion of additional cases in which the substitution of the word "Nazi" for "German" in a headline changed the psychological reaction to be expected from a dispatch. Next in importance in this category are the more than 15 million Germans who, under the terms of the Potsdam declaration, were to be expelled from East of the Oder and Neisse lines, and from the Sudetenland, Hungary, and Rumania. The average American, who relies upon his daily paper, has never learned the facts about this mass atrocity.

Attempt after attempt was made to induce our large newspapers, magazines, and press agencies, to treat these events according to what they held in store for the millions of people involved, as well as for the ideals for which this country fought, and for the American taxpayer, who by now has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on efforts to keep the survivors of this tragedy alive in Western Germany. The religious press, both Protestant and Catholic, did what it could, and truly liberal publications such as *The New Leader* and *The Progressive* did likewise, but references to this matter in the daily press were few and obscure. Ultimately, those interested in making the truth known, formed "The Committee against Mass Expulsions" and resorted to the publication of pamphlets. Three were issued: "The Tragedy of a People," dealing with the Sudeten Germans; "The Land of the Dead," dealing with the expellees from East of the Oder and Neisse lines; and "Men without the Rights of Man," dealing with people of German ancestry (supposed or real—the ancestors of some of them having come from The Netherlands and from Alsace-Lorraine; in many cases Jews were included) from the Balkans, including Hungary. The government of Hungary, incidentally, mustered up the courage to make it known that it had never desired the indiscriminate expulsion of people on the basis of racial descent.

The identification of all the Germans with the stereotype of the Nazi world would have suffered a serious blow had the average American learned of the Nazi policies, amounting in this case to genocide, practiced by some of our Allies on the basis of the Potsdam declaration.

Headlines of such stories as were published concerning the mass expulsions were frequently "doctored up." Thus *The New York Times* of May 12, 1947, carries a story by John MacCormac, which begins: "Czechoslovakia has called her children from all over the world to fill the vacuum left in the Sudetenland by the expulsion of 3,500,000 Germans." The choice of words in this sentence, as well as in the remainder of the dispatch, is guided by the wish to make the actions of the Czech government appear in the most favorable light. The headline goes a step farther in this direction: "Czechs Returning to Sudeten Homes"—a strange way of describing the process of calling people from the far corners of the world to take over the homes of people who have been expelled, often with no more than they could carry on their backs, and sometimes after they had undergone horrible experiences!

Similarly, *The New York Times* of April 30, 1946, published a picture of Sudeten Germans being expelled. The caption: "German Nationals on Their Way Out of Czechoslovakia Leaving a camp near Prague for

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their homeland. It is estimated that over 2,000,000 Germans may be removed from the country." For the Sudetens, Germany had never been their "homeland"; they were Austrians who in 1919 were assigned to Czechoslovakia against the Austrian government's protest, and who were German citizens only after the Munich pact, which had been concluded between Hitler and the Western Allies, without their consultation.

Take a picture published in *The Chicago Daily News* of June 8, 1945, under the heading: "A Weary Trek Home." Underneath we read: "A German War Refugee, traveling to her home, sits on a bench in Berlin and cries. The cart contains her few belongings." At that time, refugees with a "home" anywhere in Germany were not in Berlin which was, however, the center through which expellees from East of the Oder and Neisse line moved on their way to Western Germany, where nobody wanted them.

In detail there were, of course, differences in the attitude of different newspapers. The lead in reporting from Germany in terms of stereotypes—and with the implication of collective guilt, and the need for collective punishment for all Germans—was taken by *PM's* brilliant Victor Bernstein. His skill won him not a few admirers and imitators among his fellow correspondents, and no little fear on the part of Military Government officials. He initiated the press campaign which led to the ouster of General Patton as commander of the Third Army, and of Mr. Schaeffer as Bavarian Prime Minister. Thus the precedent was established that whenever an influential member of the Military Government acted with a view of German affairs different from that which required all Germans, except extreme Leftists, to be punished as Nazis, this official was placed under a pressure which was certain to secure, if not this removal, at least a modification of his policies.

On a previous occasion ("Denazification or Renazification?", *Forum*, November 1947, p. 261) I have quoted Mr. Laird Bell, a New Deal lawyer in Chicago and for six months the Deputy Director of the Economic Division of the Military Government in Berlin. He spoke of the "blood-thirstiness of the so-called liberal press" and of the resultant "military jumpiness." He found himself personally challenged when *The Chicago Sun* published a series of articles by Edd Johnson, the target of which was his former superior, General Draper. One of Mr. Johnson's articles was headed, "Soft or Hard Peace? 'Draper' Plan for Germany, Investment Bankers' Idea, Not What Army Foresaw." The dispatch contained these paragraphs:

> The "Draper" plan for carrying out the Big Three's Potsdam declaration for reconverting Germany to a peaceful, democratic, and agricultural nation was drawn up by men who for the most part never dodged a German 88 mm. shell and never smelled a concentration camp.
>
> The chief of the O.M.G.U.S. (Office of Military Government, United States) economics division and the signer of the Draper plan is Brig. Gen. William H. Draper, Jr., formerly an executive with the investment banking house of Dillon, Read & Co. of New York. His principal advisers are financiers and industrialists. . . .
>
> In earlier articles in this series, it has been shown how the Draper plan deviates from the plan proposed by Henry J. Morgenthau, Jr., former Secretary of the Treasury. The fact is that the Potsdam declaration was drawn largely in the tough spirit of the Morgenthau plan, but it is being administered as far as the United States is concerned in the more tender spirit of the Draper plan.

Such a type of attack was bound to impress a great many readers, even if in this case Mr. Laird Bell was able to secure the publication of a reply in a "Letter to the Editor" which, however, could rival Johnson's attacks neither in space nor in prominence. General Draper was able to escape the fate of General Patton, and so was General Clay, the open target of many similar attacks. Both men, however, had to change their policies in important respects in order to survive as long as they did.

It is interesting to note that the enterprise of our reporters in acquainting our officials in German with the policy which they expect to be pursued has not diminished with the lapse of time. Mr. Jack Raymond reports in these words. (*The New York Times*, July 6, 1949), on the first press conference given by Mr. John J. McCloy after his arrival in Germany as General Clay's successor:

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> Mr. McCloy was asked to comment on whether he had been advised of the apparent return of Nazis and the Nazi-like element to positions of responsibility in Germany. He said that this had not yet been brought to his attention. He then was asked to say what he would favor when given the choice between 'reform and recovery.' He said that this would depend on the given situation. Pressed once more to state whether he would retain a Nazi in the German economy if he felt it would be in the interests of German recovery, Mr. McCloy refused to answer.

It seems that Mr. McCloy had been forewarned and knew how to counter the attack. Still, it is obvious that our responsible officials will continue to be bedeviled by journalistic critics who are anxious to identify their views with those of a public opinion to which they rarely give facts which would allow it to form views of its own.

The space available within the confines of this article makes it imposible to deal in detail with the efforts of responsible journalists to give a less biased picture of conditions in Germany than has been related in the preceding pages. Inasmuch as *The New York Times* correspondents and headline writers have been quoted among those not living up to proper standards, it is only fair to add that the editorial page of *The Times* has (certainly after the publication of the Morgenthau-inspired directive JCS 1067 for the government of Germany, in October 1945, made it plain where most of the Potsdam policies originated), been a model of fairness in presenting and analyzing facts concerning Germany. That Anne O'Hare McCormick's column was always as much distinguished by unbiased information as it was by its style hardly needs mentioning. The contrast between the editorial page of *The Times* and some of its news reports may have inspired the following sentences contained in the editorial, "News and the Editorial Page" (issue of January 21, 1947):

> Without an objective, comprehensive news report to rely on even the editorial writer is attempting to make a safe crossing over quicksand. The public, less able, perhaps, to detect bias in the news columns, is here on even more perilous footing. The editorial page performs its important function, too, of informing and leading opinion. If from time to time in some places its leadership should be in the wrong direction, the dependable corrective is always close at hand if the news columns present the facts honestly.

The "if" near the end of the last sentence is circled in red pencil in my clipping; it may have been so circled, figuratively speaking, in the mind of the editorial writer.

Inasmuch as exception has been taken to the reporting in *The Chicago Sun* (a great many more dubious pieces from its columns could have been quoted), it is only just to quote a few paragraphs from a dispatch by Mr. Frederick Kuh (November 24, 1946) which has never been rivalled in its outspokenness, although Mr. Kuh firmly believed in the policies of his paper. In his words:

> American, British, Russian, French, and other Allied officials, civil and military, are living in Berlin nowadays as Borgia lived in ancient Rome or the Victorian viceroy in Delhi. Almost all the Allied authorities and (doubly jolting to me, personally) newspapermen, too, are wallowing in unbelievable extravagance. A few American reporters have the self-cognizance to describe themselves as sahibs, lording it in Poona.
>
> It goes without saying that all these Allied representatives, in uniform and in civilian clothes, are entitled to everything compatible with decency. When lone Americans dwell in Berlin houses with as many as 22 rooms, when each meal resembles a tribal festival, when servants rush to fulfill their flimsiest whim, the frontier of decency is erased.
>
> It would take many more words than space allows, including some unprintable ones, to describe the excesses of lavish living in the Allied settlements in the German capital. You can write your own description by imagining a prince of the Arabian Nights, and then multiplying by a thousand and one his indulgences.

One reporter is rarely so critical of another. Had Mr. Kuh returned permanently to Germany his dispatches might soon in all matters have shown the qualities by which his pre-war correspondence was distinguished (and which later could be plainly seen in his London dispatches).

A special word of recognition is necessary for *Newsweek*, whose Berlin Bureau, in particular while headed by James P. O'Donnell, reported straight facts, imperturbably, during long periods when this was still ex-

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ceptional. *Life* and *Time* were among the stragglers. Still, *Time's* report on Germany in the issue of April 4, 1949, made up for much of the delay; it is as good a sociological analysis as it is a news report. *Time* had also dared break the log-jam in regard to reporting the irregularities which accompanied the trial of the Germans accused of participation in the Malmedy massacre (January 16, 1949). It is interesting to note that *The New York Times* (March 2, 1949), published a long report on this topic which was gathered in this country by William R. Conklin; this way of supplementing the dispatches of the reporters stationed in Germany can hardly be interpreted except as an implied criticism of the latter.

Thus, there is improvement, but it is neither general nor sufficient. As a matter of fact, certain recent dispatches published in *The Chicago Daily News* (and the papers using its service) could have been quoted to show that there are symptoms of retrogression, although it must again be added that the editorials of *The News,* and in particular those signed by Mr. Knight, its publisher, leave little to be desired.

The question may be asked whether there is reason to expect that American public opinion at home, and American officials in Germany, will soon get their due. *Time's* observation that "Western policy (in Germany) has been an incoherent stammer" is correct; but this fact can hardly be ascribed to the wishes of the average American, and has long since been realized and regretted by those American officials in Germany, as in Washington, who were interested in positive results rather than in the implementation of conclusions drawn from stereotypes.

The colonel wanted a horse, but, unable to buy a thoroughbred, he had to be satisfied with an old hack.

"This one, sir," said the dealer, "has been bred in the best military traditions."

The colonel purchased the horse, and a few days later angrily returned to the dealer.

"I thought you said that this horse was bred in the best military traditions," he shouted.

"So he is," returned the dealer, "He'd sooner die than run."—*Ireland's Saturday Night*

A utility executive sent an efficiency expert through the office to work out improvements. After a thorough inspection he reported:

"My only suggestion is that you bank the curve near the time clock."—*Gas Flame*

Foreign diplomacy usually goes in strong for butter—ask any American diplomat who has watched it being spread. But Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes was one man who couldn't be greased with butter.

When Mr. Hughes arrived in Havanna one time to attend a Pan American conference, an interpreter murmured into his ears the buttery praise that was being showered upon him by a local orator. But the great jurist called a halt to the translation.

Turning to his aid, he hissed, "Don't bother interpreting anything until he says 'but'. From there on give me every word."—*Wall Street Journal*

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The influence of oratory and costumes

The Economic Basis of Southern Politics (IV)

By THOMAS D. CLARK

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BEHIND any explanation of southern political behavior lie the factors covered thus far in this series. In a final analysis it is difficult to say which ones are the most important within themselves. Perhaps none, however, is more important than the personality factor. The southerner is undoubtedly no more personal in his public affairs than are other people, but certainly he is as personal. Because of the vast rural areas of the region, politicians long ago learned the importance of personal prejudices and viewpoints, and they have built a strong tradition of personal politics around this philosophy.

No southern community is without its great body of political stories and personalities. Kentucky, for instance, has supplied a rich volume of political lore to American history. No evening is boring when "old timers" begin reminiscing about political personalities of the past. Around the successful officeseeker there is nearly always a considerable body of legend. Even unsuccessful candidates have become legendary figures. There is almost no end to the stories of the campaigns in all of the southern states since the Civil War. Personalities like Tom Watson, "Pitchfork" Ben Tillman, James Kimball Vardaman, Leroy Percy, Hoke Smith, Cole Blease, "Cotton Ed" Smith, Tom Heflin, Bob and Alf Taylor and scores of others are legendary heroes.

Perhaps there is nothing the average southerner likes to do more than to discuss politics and tell political stories. Generally, talk of politics does not involve any profound discussion of fundamental issues. There are issues, of course, but these often form the larger and more indefinable backdrop for the pageantry which is being performed nearer the footlight of publicity. Talk of politics in the South has more often concerned itself with the techniques and tricks of the trade. Personalities have distinguished themselves because of their distinct abilities to handle problems on the hustings. Much emphasis has been placed historically on the capacity of the southern politician to adapt himself in both dress and language to the level of most of his semi-illiterate constituents. Certain nicknames have reflected this tendency. There were "Pitchfork" Ben, "Cotton" Ed, "Cotton" Tom, "Red Gallus" Gene, "Fiddlin'" Bob and "White Chief" Jim. Such terms as "Wool Hat Boys," "Red Necks," "Hill Billies," "Clod Hoppers," and "Crackers" are indicative of this tendency. Candidates have gone forth to admire babies, brag about dogs and horses, sympathize in illnesses and injuries, talk weather, crops and taxes, rake-up kinships, tell stories, talk religion, sing songs.

The editor of the Athens (Tennessee) *Post* said the southern political garb of the 1880's had become purely agrarian in composition.

> It consists of rye, oat, and wheat straw hats trimmed with cotton blooms. Shirts of homespun, with shuck collars ruffled with potato vines and bound with corn tassles; coats manufactured from corn and cotton staples, cut with long capacious pockets, and fringed around tail and collar with corn silks and cotton blossoms. Pants made of pea vines, fastened with cymbling buttons and held up by onion top suspenders. These suits are so contrived that as the wearer moves along hayseed falls in gentle showers along his path.

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This pretty well explains the attempts of the so-called "Wool Hat Boys" and "Red Gallus" men which have received so much publicity in the past. Ben Tillman with his famous jeans breeches, Gene Talmadge with his red galluses, James Kimball Vardaman with his long hair, and Bilbo with his red tie and horseshoe stickpin were gesturing to their constitutents.

Even more important than the surface manifestations of dress and dialectical peculiarities have been marked abilities on the part of an army of politicians to handle keen repartee. A clever quip or a stinging barb thrust at an opponent has always been worth an appreciable number of votes. Running for office in the South has often been somewhat like joining a rowdy debating society where emphasis was upon craftiness on the platform rather than upon ability to perform the duties of office. Stories told on the stump, or quips uttered in attack and self-defense have been repeated hundreds of times with the same relish as though they were clever athletic feats.

Perhaps no people in the history of civilization have enjoyed oratory more than have southerners. For both orator and listener, this form of expression has perhaps best expressed the region's extrovert nature. Those candidates who have been able to mount the platform and make a recitation of commonplace facts eloquent and awesome have had little need to make any incriminating commitments of future plans. Intoxicating oratory has on countless occasions swept audiences to candidates' sides when dispassionate statements of facts would have driven them home in defeat. It may be safely said that, in numerous instances, the ability to speak for hours without apparent fatigue and without reciting too many of the cold, dull facts of public affairs have endeared politicians to southern voters for decades.

Good examples of the golden tongued orators were John Sharp Williams and James Kimball Vardaman, of Mississippi; Bob and Alf Taylor, of Tennessee; William O. Bradley, James B. McCreary, and Joe Blackburn, of Kentucky; Ben Tillman, of South Carolina; and Hoke Smith, of Georgia.

In Mississippi, Vardaman and his successor Theodore G. Bilbo were masters of the stump. They were not so eloquent as were other southern politicians, but they had great capacity for captivating their audiences. They not only could sense the tenor of thought of their hearers, but they were masterful in channeling that thought into the course which they wished it to follow. Using somewhat different techniques in detail, they both achieved the same results.

Vardaman was able to arouse an audience to a point of near violence. He attacked "interests," opponents, and Negroes with ferocious language. His method was to pound away at audience resistance by an unusually skillful use of alliteration. His speeches actually became physical endurance contests in the use of alliterative words strung together in almost endless sentences. His speeches had the effect of a rising storm, and when he reached his climaxes, he had his listeners in what contemporary revivalists called "a weaving way." In some instances, his verbal attacks were so virulent that near race wars followed his appearances in Mississippi towns.

BILBO

Theodore G. Bilbo used the old "White Chief's" general technique, but ignored his use of alliteration. Perhaps Bilbo had a better education than Vardaman and could apply the art of persuasion with more facility. He was an excellent psychologist, and interpreted with amazing accuracy the temper of each crowd which he addressed. He was not a flowery orator in the old sense of the word. The weather, beautiful and virtuous women, the beauties of home, cattle grazing on a thousand hills, good drinking water, the joys of living, and the scream of the American eagle little interested him. He gave more attention to being able to call people by their names during his speeches and getting from them the audible sanctions which they habitually gave their preachers on Sunday. He was adept at making himself a part of the audience in spirit and in fact, and made it appear that not he but every person friendly to him was making the speech. Knowing full well the value of Biblical quotations and allusions, Bilbo often spoke from a figurative

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pulpit rather than the political stump. Godly sanction for what he said was worth more than a ton of statistical fact in establishing reasons why he should be returned to office.

Not only did Bilbo use the scriptures to good advantage but he likewise handled the strong oaths of his hearers with great effect. He was a master at using the history, or what he said was the history, of civilization to his advantage. His speeches on white supremacy were frequently inter-larded with highly generalized references to the whole history of mankind. Bilbo, however, had a surprising knowledge of many sociological works and could quote and misquote them with telling effects upon an uninformed audience. An aggressive speaker, he carried bitter attacks to his enemies, both known and imaginary. Sometimes he thrust his lance at enemies no more tangible or definable than "outsiders." He was shrewd in his knowledge that nothing would excite the average, sunburned, common man dressed in overalls more than to be told that someone from the "outside" planned to put one over on him. An attack on the "interests" which proposed to exploit his labors likewise aroused the common man to a fighting tempo.

THE UNDERDOG

It must be said that promises were made in all of the speeches of southern politicians. They promised to improve conditions in public services which would make life more bearable for the common man. Schools were to be improved. Roads were promised isolated communities. State institutions of all sorts were to be overhauled and expanded so that the people would get a bigger return for their tax money, except they were told in a more affirmative way that they would be given better services by every branch of government. Oratory could be highly useful in portraying the failures of incumbent administrations and in outlining the improvements of the future.

There seems to have been little difference historically in the mode of political attack made by politicians throughout the South. The pattern varied only in detail and not in the general framework. Everywhere there was the element of promise to the underdog. Politicians not only emphasized the underdog position of the people, but most of the successful ones were at one time or another able to put themselves in the position of being underdogs. It was a fortunate candidate indeed who could get an attack made upon himself that would put him in the position of being a poor defenseless man, fighting with his back to the wall, where he had been thrust by a high and mighty opponent. If a candidate could say that his opponent was an aristocrat who disdained living as the common people had to live, he had a marked advantage in the race. There is no way of judging how much influence the underdog theme has had in making political decisions in the South. It seems reasonable to assert that it has been one of the decisive factors in many elections.

In appealing to the southern people for support, every wise politician has understood that there were two aspects to campaigning. There was that phase in which he took his appeal directly to the people. He spoke to them directly from the platform and shook as many hands as he could reach. The other was working with organized local groups. Unfortunately there is no good study of what is perhaps the South's most notable political institution, the "courthouse ring." A study of the political divisional maps of the southern states will show excessive numbers of county units. Possibly South Carolina is an exception to this. Kentucky, with an area of 40,500 square miles, has 120 counties, and Georgia, with an area of 59,264 square miles, has 159 counties. Every county has a courthouse and its set of local elective officials. By the very nature of local governmental organization, there is a certain amount of political cohesion among county officers. Added to this influence is the patronage factor of county road supervisors, institutional managers, and county superintendents of public instruction. Thus it is possible to build up a fairly strong county machine. Each of these rings have tentacles which reach to the statehouses, and state officials have usually been cautious in making moves which would antagonize these grass roots machines.

There has been an interesting reciprocity between the purely local politician and those who seek higher office. The local candidate

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has often ridden on the coat-tails of the man seeking major office. At the same time, the major politicians have known the great value to their cause of being properly aligned with the right local group. It is in this field of southern politics that the greatest amount of personal response has been made to the election of officials. It is in the courthouse machine that much of the conglomerate web-work of southern politics has been woven. If the courthouse ring were properly analyzed, it would be found that such matters as close personal obligations, friendship, kinship, hope of patronage, community feuds, love of power, personal prejudices, dissatisfaction with public services, and common venality were among the more important factors which held it together.

LOCAL RINGS

These local rings in many states have in fact constituted most of the "line" which important politicians have had in mind. When a southern politician says that "word has been sent down the line," he means that those in control of local politics were informed at least as to what was wanted of them. Since the advent of the automobile and the good roads movement of this century, highway officials have been in key positions to take the word down the line in the form of contracts, location of highways, promise of employment to large numbers of potential supporters as common laborers, and the favorable location of state garages and operating plants. This same principle has been followed in the location of state institutions and facilities. The local rings have been influential in many cases in bringing to their communities permanent favors in the form of continuous employment of labor and the purchase of goods of local merchants.

Other pressure groups which have operated almost since the end of the Civil War are the crusaders who have fought for moral and educational betterment. The moral crusaders have been able at times to bring into play an enormous amount of political influence. They have often supplied effective opposition to conditions which have not been conducive to a strict observance of the taboos of rather straitlaced evangelical religious concepts. Perhaps the major crusade in this field has been that against liquor. A crazy-quilt pattern of control laws has existed in the South since 1865. These have ranged all the way from state sale of liquor in South Carolina during the Tillman period to the ever shifting sands of local option control in Kentucky. It has been a rash politician indeed who opposed the interests of many of these crusading groups. Frankly many office-seekers have paid eloquent lip service to these causes and have done little to further their interest once they were in office.

Whatever the personal and group influences are in southern politics, it seems safe to draw at least three conclusions: the southern political system is a complex one; there are few constants in the details of campaigning but in general the pattern as a whole shows relatively small diversity. Finally, politics is a highly personalized game. For a vast majority of southerners playing at politics, it has been not necessarily the democratic process in action, so much as a thoroughly delightful sport. It is not too much to say that politics has been as much a part of the southerners' pastime as have sporting events. The personalities in the game have borne almost the same relationship to the southerner's thinking as did the great names in American sporting events. Actually the attitude toward southern politicians has varied between that of love and respect for camp meeting evangelists and sporting heroes.

Long ago southerners developed a certain defensive loyalty toward their section which appears to have been carried over into their political activities. They have often been loyal to personalities rather than alert to fundamental issues. To approach an understanding of southern politics without first comprehending the myriad personal elements involved would result in a faulty concept of both the region's political system and its leaders.

A bishop of New York State started signing all his letters "William of Albany." One day this bishop met a superior church official who informed him: "I am trying to get you a transfer to Buffalo so you can sign 'Buffalo Bill'." —*American Farm Youth*

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

JASPER R. LEWIS

Books in brief

Man's constant search and battle for his security is much like society's quest for stability; in fact, there is much in common in the two motives. The struggle for some level of sound living seems to go back to Biblical times. Frederick E. Dessauer, German born and educated, offers a study of this driving force in *Stability* (Macmillan, $3.50). Between difficulty with the language and an exactness of style typical of heavy-handed German education, the book misses a chance to make itself simple and interesting enough to hold general readers. This is unfortunate, as its subject matter and treatment should make a wide appeal.

Dessauer shows the ever present differences between those who wish change or progress and those who prefer the status quo. This opposition always has existed. As Dessauer puts it, "In a provisional way one may define stability as the continuity of the existing social and political conditions." One need only enlarge on that to cover the basic human desire to hold what one has, if good, and to defend it against others.

The Greeks, with their vision of the city as a symbol of stability; the Jews, tying their laws to a written Covenant and revelation; the Calvinists, with their beliefs in discipline; all are quoted to show an early and continuing visualization of a method of stability for the human race.

History shows the struggle to acquire stability in the several leading nations as a matter of principle, exemplified by the policies of Metternich and the battle of the Catholic Church in the centuries of declining temporal power accompanying the Reformation, and the industrial revolution. In the field of business, the changes wrought by adventurous men made for progress, despite the normal desire of the successful to retain their standing as it was. In other words, side by side with progress went both hesitating conservatist and bold discoverer.

Economic conditions in the present century, with two world wars and a depression, are examined, particularly from the viewpoint of government planning. In the case of Germany, the author shows her planning for total war. In the United States, the depression years of the 1930's show an attempt to plan for peace, through the New Deal.

The concept of stability on the part of various writers through the ages varies from Keynes to Marx. Dessauer discusses the literal meaning and the spirit of stability, and the popular understanding as well. As he points out, in the modern world, "There may be peace without stability, but there is no longer stability without peace." There are many concise definitions to emphasize the drift of Dessauer's arguments. The struggle between the haves and the have-nots is covered by this brief sentence: "The stability of the malcontent is aggressive, that of the conservative is defensive." Whether in business, law, or education, that is generally true.

Stability does not necessarily mean stagnation; it does require that social changes must not be too many, too fast, or too radical for proper assimilation. Systems of balance and of integration must operate to maintain a certain stability even in change. This is as true of society in general as it is of individuals.

Dessauer discusses the position of the United Nations and its possibilities in the international picture as have other economists before him, seeing its aspects favorable and unfavorable. Throughout, his interest seems to be to show man's quest for security, and the influences of church, state, and individuals over the centuries to overthrow or, contrariwise, advance that quest. It is a discussion of changes by governments, persons, and groups,

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political or economic, and is devoted to an examination of this powerful and fundamental objective of the human being. It shows a keen perception of man's problems. There is no suggested formula for stability, but by noting the historical record of the past, Dessauer points up sharply the needs of the present on a question of immediate interest.

BRIEFER COMMENT

Of General Interest

Twenty-nine post-war speeches by the former Prime Minister are included in *The Sinews of Peace,* by Winston S. Churchill (Houghton Mifflin, $3.00), edited by Randolph Churchill. These range from October, 1945, to the end of 1946, and include the famous Fulton, Missouri, speech which gives the book its title.

A study of the governments of the United States and England, to show similarities and differences, is contained in *The Two Constitions,* by Harold Stannard (Van Nostrand, $3.00). By discussing Senate and Lords, Commons and the House, the author presents the more important points about each and gives a picture of the two democratic systems.

Some of the mysteries and secrets of the lamaseries are revealed in a lively travelogue, *Golden Doorway to Thibet,* by Nicol Smith (Bobbs-Merrill, $3.75). Smith, author of *Burma Road,* here relates his adventures and experiences in a journey through Kashmir and Ladakh, with photographs of interesting people and places.

The Realities of American-Palestine Relations, by Frank E. Manuel (Public Affairs, Press, $5.00), offers a study not only of American interest in Palestine, but of the ups and downs of the Zionist movement, the impact of the policies of Britain and other countries upon it, and the final recognition of Israel. It is written from the point of view of a partisan Zionist.

The saga of the American Indian, from the anthropological theories of his travels from Asia over the Bering Straits, is made an interesting tale in *They Came Here First,* by D'Arcy McNickle (Lippincott, $3.75). McNickle has been with the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs since 1936. The book is in the People of America Series.

The development, formulation, and application of foreign policy is given in detailed, comprehensive form in *How Foreign Policy Is Made,* by Kurt London (Van Nostrand, $3.50). Here is the general scope of foreign policy and the factors upon which it is based. The author covers the United States, Britain, France, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union. How the policies are implemented (which covers generally known methods and such other devices as psychological warfare) forms an instructive part of the work. London has worked for the government and gives the official view on some things: "The 'spoils system' is non-existent for career foreign service personnel."

Newspaperwoman, by Agnes Underwood (Harper, $3.50), is the autobiographical reminiscences of the author, reporter, and city editor of Los Angeles. In this volume, she relates some of the bigger stories which she wrote, with the details of some of Los Angeles' more popular crime trials, in particular those of screen stars. There are some songs of praise for Hearst and his sons, the bosses of the author's newspaper.

The beautiful but bleak characteristics of Canada's Gaspé region are brought to life in *Gaspé,* Land of History and Romance, by Blodwen Davies (Greenberg, $4.50). The geographic and vacation attractions are shown in text and photograph, and many of the legendary and historical tales of the centuries help make the book a pleasant travelogue.

Edwin Valentine Mitchell relates many of the truths and some of the fictions about Maine in *It's an Old State of Maine Custom* (Vanguard, $3.00). Some of the customs are very pleasant to read about, and Mitchell helps by giving some recipes for preparing and eating lobsters, blueberries, and clams.

An outline of the progress made by medical science during the war and since, *Medicine on the March,* by Marguerite Clark (Funk & Wagnalls, $3.50), gives some of the findings of doctors and scientists on such ills as heart disease, cancer, tuberculosis, and hypertension. Not exactly technical, it offers little for

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the professional, and a chance for conversation and phobias for the lay reader.

The founding and development of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad, "The Burlington," are pictured and related in *Granger Country,* Edited by Lloyd Lewis and Stanley Pargellis (Little, Brown, $5.00). Illustrations of the pioneer years show the obstacles of wilderness, Indians, and outlaws, and the pictures of the early years of this century in some ways seem almost as funny and indicative of periods as those of the nineteenth century.

The Aspirin Age, 1919-1941, Edited by Isabel Leighton, (Simon & Schuster, $3.95), is a collection of chapters on the sometimes comic and sometimes tragic highlights of yesteryear. All of the chapters are by well known writers, from Harry Hansen to Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. There is a little nostalgia in reading about Izzy and Moe of prohibition days, Huey Long, Aimee Semple McPherson, and others.

That veteran exponent of correct usage of English, John Baker Opdycke, now admonishes us to *Mark My Words* (Harper, $5.00), in a volume intended to be a guide to modern usage and expression. By looking up the word you are using in a 3-column, 47 page index, you can quickly find the differences between *antipasto, hors d'oeuvre,* and *smorgasbord,* with explanations of the varying meanings. That is but an appetizing example. Our old friend J. B. O. just helped get the right word elsewhere in this column, and the book should be a boon to writers.

Fiction

The historical setting of *Prepare Them for Caesar,* by Mary Louise Mabie (Little, Brown, $3.50), serves only as an indicator of time, while the political ambitions of the consul are shown through his love affairs, and marriages. It might be called Caesar in modern style and dress; it does away with heroics and shows the man. A little brusqueness of style and short sentences prevent smooth reading.

A novel for Freudian disciples, *Inner Harbor,* by Frederick Wight (Atlantic-Little, Brown, $3.00), is a love story involving the psychoanalyst with his own patient, and in a sense showing his reactions to emotions as well as hers. In fact, it's a case book of sensitive and sensual souls, largely members of one family. Good characterizations of figures whose actions provide "situations" hold the reader's interest.

The Journey of Simon McKeever, by Albert Maltz (Little, Brown, $2.75), might be made required reading for psychiatrists and some of their patients. The whole story is the recital of McKeever's journey across California, seeking an elusive cure for his arthritis. An old man of 74, his reminiscences interspersed among the pages describing his ride-thumbing, make for a study out of life, with philosophy, human nature, and humor throughout. It's an odd story, exceptionally well told and developed.

Outstanding should be the designation of *Elephant Walk,* by Robert Standish, (Macmillan, $3.00). Like his earlier novels, the scene is in the Orient, this time Ceylon. Behind a story of love, good and bad, is the life of an Englishman's family and its coffee (later tea) plantation, and native superstitions. The elephant's long memory is a small but tragic part. Here is a tale of people who have real passions and foibles, with an exotic atmosphere to bring excitement to the reader.

The idea of existentialism with all its melancholy, pessimistic trappings is displayed in *Nausea,* by Jean-Paul Sartre (New Directions, $2.50). Translated from the French by Lloyd Alexander, it is my idea of the autobiography of an atrabilious (credit J. B. Opdycke's new book mentioned earlier) individual. Made up of a series of sketches of Parisians, mostly middle class, it reveals their petty tragedies and hopelessness, exemplifying Sartre's: "I am, I exist, I think, therefore I am; I am because I think, why do I think? . . . ."

A Diplomatic Incident, by Judith Kelly (Houghton, Mifflin, $2.75), is concerned with the conflict of ideologies of the United States and Russia, expressed through secret agents and undercover investigators in Washington. It's quite in keeping with the year 1949, but a bit too argumentative to make interesting reading except for fellow travelers or extreme chauvinists.

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The THEATER ARTS



by John Gassner

After 75 years the Western theatre has explored many styles and techniques only to witness the exhaustion of each of them. Some of these exhausted themselves quickly and quite thoroughly so that they have proved fruitful only on very rare occasions and then only when diluted.

Symbolism, which once seemed to open up so many possibilities when Maeterlinck's *The Blue Bird* and the plays of Verhaerren and Andreyev ruled the theatrical roost, soon came to be regarded as laughably naive. When Philip Barry nobly attempted symbolism in *Here Come the Clowns* and suffused it with exceptional thoughtfulness and feeling, it was found much too obscure although the parallel it drew in 1938 between an illusionist's tricks and fascism was close enough to public concern. When Barry attempted allegory several years later in *Liberty Jones* his effort was found too transparent and we told ourselves that the allegorical method may have been good enough for the Middle Ages but was rather childish in our own time. Expressionism flared up briefly in Central Europe and collapsed after the dervish dance of its devotees, leaving behind only a few plays like *R. U. R.* and *The Insect Comedy* that the theatre has cared to revive now and then. In France and England expressionism took no root at all, and in America, where it provided a stimulus to the young O'Neill, it proved to be a passing fancy. It was yoked to musical comedy on the one occasion when it enjoyed any success at all after 1930—in Moss Hart's *Lady in the Dark*. When at the present time post-war Germany brings forth an expressionist piece like *Outside the Door*, it proves to be inept in spite of flashes of inspired writing.

"Theatricalism," the style that was supposed to simply evoke the pure joy of playacting and theatricality, did not produce a single dramatic composition of any importance either in Europe or America, except perhaps the lonely "jazz-symphony" *Processional* by John Howard Lawson. Nor did the "formalism" so highly prized in the productions of Jacques Copeau at the Théatre du Vieux Colombier give us any dramatic literature. "Constructivism" and mechanistic theories of acting, which aroused the interest of the world during Meyerhold's brief rule in the Russian theatre, vanished completely—also without leaving a single living play behind. It might be argued that since these were essentially theatrical rather than dramatic modes, they should not be judged by whether or not they gave us good plays. Yet we cannot overlook the fact that every vital style of dramatic production in the past yielded a harvest of plays and was justified by this ability to inspire a literature. Without a literature of its own, even the most attractive type of theatre dies of inanition and proves to be only a flash in the dark. The fate of experimental styles in our theatre has been, on the contrary, a quick demise with no progeny to cheat time.

But what about the realism and the naturalism that brought modernity into the Western theatre? Naturalism, in the narrow sense of the term, actually enjoyed no more than a decade of fruitfulness, giving rise to some theatrical reforms in Paris and Berlin and to some plays of more or less lasting value: *The Father, Countess Julie, The Vultures,* and *The Weavers*. It was essentially a reaction to naturalism that instigated a return to romanticism in such plays as *Cyrano de*

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Bergerac and *Pelleas and Melissande*. If, in our time, naturalism has appeared in a few successful plays like Sidney Kingsley's *Dead End* and the current *Detective Story*, it has lacked its high concentration and scientific aloofness; *Dead End* was devoted to social reform, and *Detective Story* preaches a moral. The only pure naturalistic play that has won a public in two decades has been *Tobacco Road!* Realism, of course, we still have with us. It is responsible for most of the plays written here and abroad. Nevertheless, it is obvious to all of us that the instrument that had such a cutting edge for Ibsen has become badly blunted. Except when Lilian Hellman pushes it with might and main in a *Little Foxes* or *Watch on the Rhine*, it seems good enough only for cutting the rancid cheese of some stale and commonplace situation. It has lost its value as a scalpel, and those who persist in employing it for social analysis or for psychological analysis scratch only the surface. Is it surprising, then, that hardly any season reveals more than two or three realistic plays of acceptable quality in New York or London.

For plumbing the depths of the individual psyche realism is of little avail because it can present life in orderly fashion only on one plane and can let an audience see only the surface that any outsider sees. Realistic drama is preeminently logical, but the inner self is not logical. The realist cannot allow the individual character to expose its inner processes by means of soliloquies and asides, nor is he free to reveal these by comment. For "depth psychology," the realist is in the position of a diver whose hands and feet are bound, and who is deprived of a pipe line through which he can inhale oxygen and communicate with the surface.

What about social reality, however? Society presses hard upon us, it affects many of our important activities, and never before have men been more aware of social realities. The newspapers and books, the Congressional records and the economic reports are full of these "realities." Surely there is enough here for the explorations that the realist can make successfully? He has been at ease, it is true, in dealing with "manners," although not more than pre-realistic playwrights from Plautus and Terence to Molière. The Somerset Maughams, S. N. Behrmans, and Noel Cowards are very much at ease, indeed. But can the realistic playwright actually cope with the social realities that have mattered most in our own time? These are economic and political, they consist of intertwined strands of fact so that what happens in one situation affects another, and what happens in Moscow, Berlin, or London determines what will happen in New York, or vice versa. Finance is as complicated a process as any science, and its effect is of paramount importance; and this is also true of agriculture, industry, and commerce. You cannot really speak of social fact without taking into account such matters as utility corporations, cartels, international trade treaties, the balance of trade, and the relation of the pound to the dollar. These and other matters, in turn, determine the business cycle, wages and prices, employment and unemployment, production and consumption. And these, in turn, have a necessary relation to the stability of the home, the happiness of children, and love. "What's happened to love?" sang a musical comedy performer, and the chorus replied, "Economics." There are also such things as class conflict and international imbroglios.

How can the realistic playwright, who often lays claim to importance precisely on the ground of giving us a grip on reality, cope with such a whirligig of facts and relationships? As a realist, he is bound to take a segment of life and render it as the eye of the outsider would see it if he were looking through a peep-hole. He can, of course, allow his characters to discuss the complexity of their problem, but that is unlikely to give us drama that would not be static and tiresome in the extreme. He cannot even give us the pleasure of hearing an extraordinarily brilliant conversation that might compensate for the slowness of the action. Within the strict bounds of the realistic style, a representative clerk or hod-carrier must not speak like Bernard Shaw. If the dramatist, however, desires to exhibit such realities, he is at sea. The alternative to showing everything, which would disintegrate the realistic play, is to show next to nothing. He will tend to content himself with a miniscule situation which may arouse our sympathies but will demonstrate little more than the immediate throb of the

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moment in a living room. He cannot remain a realist in technique without ceasing to be a realist in the field of modern relations. He cannot "make good" any of his claims to social understanding and intellectual interest.

Against these charges there has been only one answer on the part of a vocal minority. Why bother with facts like these at all? Let us leave these to the sociologist and the economist. "Playwright, deal with the spirit—with essences, emotions, and visions. Your real task is to illuminate the receses of the heart and to create beauty." And this is likely to be associated with the recommendation that only one kind of drama is worth achieving, and that is poetic drama. But even if we discount the important consideration that the theatre must have some relation to the consciousness of its times (and it is a stridently social consciousness today), there are flies in the ointment that is peddled by the prescribers of poetic drama. One of these is that the poetic dramatist finds his way to Elizabethan romance or to some other remote period and produces only "academic" art no matter how many cash customers queue up in front of the box office. If Maxwell Anderson knows how to write a play with eloquence, color, and theatrical facility in a piece like the current *Anne of the Thousand Days,* he reaps a golden harvest, as well as compliments from critics, but the play could just as well belong to the theatre of Schiller's or Tennyson's times. "Is that necessarily bad?" Mr. Anderson could ask quite legitimately, and an honest answer would mumble something about universality being the highest desideratum in art but would qualify the statement by asserting that the universal is one thing and the academic is another. But can we say that Mr. Anderson's *Anne* is merely academic? I don't believe we can, so long as we find a good deal of vigor and incandescence in the play. Yet it is plain, I think, that it is the author's talent alone that saves the play from the flatness and sterility we associate with academicism, and that, none the less, his characters and story have no real contemporary vitality.

Besides, we encounter a second exception to the kind of poetic drama that Maxwell Anderson has successfully presented to us—namely, that his lines only masquerade as poetry. While unjust to a number of excellent passages in the plays, the charge has a certain justice which the author himself, who claims no eminence as a poet, would probably concede. This is less important, however, than the fact that the really good poets who have tried to write plays have succeeded so rarely on the stage. A moderate success was granted to T. S. Eliot's *Murder in the Cathedral* and Auden and Isherwood's *The Dog Beneath the Skin* in the English-speaking world—which is hardly an example of a trend toward poetry in the theatre in 20 theatrical seasons. Continental Europe brought forth two brilliant poets, Frederigo Garcia Lorca and Berthold Brecht, but the English-speaking audience has not seen a truly professional "commercial" production of a single play by either writer in the same two decades.

Mention of Brecht may remind us of one other trend from which much was expected—the so-called epic theatre of which Brecht is the only playwright of importance, if we rule out Robert Penn Warren as primarily a novelist with only an "epic" dramatization of his Pulitzer novel *All the Kings Men* to his credit. "Epic" theatre, as I have mentioned on previous occasions and as the brilliant Eric Bentley has argued more fully, possesses great possibilities. This was shown in Germany in the 1920's, and in a limited sense, in America during the 1930's with the Federal Theatre's living newspapers. Nevertheless, this seminal style has made virtually no headway in the Western World in well over a decade. And with this dour report, it would seem, we exhaust our inventory of the modern theatre in our time. Have all avenues of progress, then, been blocked? Can there be no genuine creation in Western society's major form of dramatic expression above the non-literary level of "mass-consumption" radio and films? We shall consider this question in the next article.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Robert Sherwood's and Irving Berlin's lavish musical comedy *Miss Liberty* violated custom by opening in New York in the very heat of the summer. It proved to be a giant butterfly fluttering gaudily on the Broadway scene. Revolving around the newspaper circulation war of James Gordon Bennett of

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The New York Herald and Joseph Pulitzer of *The New York World,* the libretto implicates Bartholdi's Statue of Liberty. Pulitzer collected pennies for the pedestal from his readers while Bennett brought over the "authentic" model for the statue who proved to be a fraud. She was saved from deportation only by the generosity of the American public. The somewhat unremarkable music and text of *Miss Liberty* proved disappointing to the press, but this "musical" was warmly received by the public. And rightly so, because the production offers the musical-comedy customer a great deal of the titillation he expects for his money—pleasant songs, two of which, *Homework* and *Let's Take an Old-Fashioned Walk* are especially appealing; striking settings by the talented Oliver Smith, and delightful costumes by "Motley;" brilliant choreography by Jerome Robbins; and very good performances by the veteran Ethel Griffes, Allyn McLerie, Mary McCarty, Eddie Albert, and others. The unevenness of the work is not likely to prove a deterrent to patronage, and the wonder is only that Robert Sherwood, Irving Berlin, and Moss Hart, the director of the show, have not been able to do still better. The real significance of the event is that, like the musical comedies of several seasons, evidence is mounting for the assumption that even in this field, for which great advances were predicted after *Oklahoma!,* the possibilities of progress appear to be exhausted. The reason, we may suspect, is that everything remains essentially synthetic on Broadway. No one dares to be simple and direct. Everyone connected with a musical comedy is concerned with baiting as many large hooks as possible for the ticket purchases, whose name has to be legion before the costs of production can be retrieved.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

Much was once expected of the development of small regional theatres in the United States. Much is still expected of it by those who have worked in it or watched it affectionately. A record of this theatre was recently published under the title of *From Native Roots* by Felix Sper (The Caxton Printers, Caldwell, Idaho, $4.00). Dr. Sper has written a meticulous and enthusiastic account of the regional stage which can be strongly recommended to anyone interested in the theatre. Dr. Sper includes plays that emerged into the highlight of the Broadway stage in an effort to show that regional drama has not had to remain simply regional. Two questions, however, insist upon rearing their heads. How is it that so much earnest activity has not given America a vital national theatre? And why have so many of the plays made absolutely no dent in the professional theatre? This would be a good subject for another considered book by the scholarly Dr. Sper.

A certain young Southern lawyer is proud of his peppery old grandfather, who practiced law when a man could put some imagination, color, and drama into his court-room labors.

Grandfather was defending a murderer of whose guilt there was little or no doubt. He could see from the first day of the trial that the jury had already convicted his client. How could he obtain a new jury?

Backing away from the jury box as far as he could, he began to relate, slowly but with mounting drama, the story of the shooting. Advancing steadily toward the goggling jury, he played upon the nerves of his auditors until they were ready to snap. Then, reaching the fatal moment of the shooting, he suddenly whipped out his pistol and emptied it into the ceiling.

The next instant the windows and doors of the place were jammed with fleeing spectators—the jury included.

When order had been restored, and the deeply contrite defense lawyer had made due apologies to the court for his unconventional outburst, he astonished the judge by asking for a new jury.

"Your Honor," he explained, "this jury has mixed with the spectators and therefore is disqualified."

He got the new jury.—*Labor*

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

COUNTRY COMMENT

The heat may have been responsible for the incident. At least I should like to think that it was responsible for my stupidity.

In summer, with its college closed and its state university withdrawn into itself, the small town of Amherst is a quiet place. But this afternoon its customary quiet was intensified by a breathlessness of atmosphere. The Jones Library, the town's famous and luxuriously-furnished little atheneum, may have been a degree or two cooler than elsewhere, but there was no more air stirring there than out of doors. Moveless in deep chairs, the few readers present seemed to make a point of honor of not noticing one another or glancing up from their reading.

After consulting the new fall and winter Sears catalogue in the magazine room to learn the lower prices of sheets, I had come into the main reading room to look up a half-remembered book on old New England gravestones. "Gravestones," the card said. "See Tombstones." I was shifting from the G's to the T's when I noticed out of the corner of my eye that the librarian, ever zealous for the good name of the library, was standing in the center of the room, gazing pointedly at a young man who sat on an elegant dark-blue upholstered sofa, absorbed in a magazine. Clearly something was wrong.

Sturdily built, well bronzed, roughly dressed, he could have just come in from a tobacco field. But what held the librarian's attention, I gathered, was the cap on his head. Perhaps originally a felt hat with most of the brim cut off, it bore a forward-tilting feather at its peak, and beneath this a row of three bells. No, not bells, but flowers, three wild yellow lilies (*Lilium canadense*) inserted in the ventilation eyelets and dangling in a very bell-like manner.

Though the cap was becoming and worn with complete aplomb, I gave it only a glance before returning to my search for tombstones. What but the deathly heat could have so dulled my curiosity?

The young man did not look up. The librarian continued to gaze. Finally he must have softly broken the silence, for though I did not hear him speak, I heard the reply. The young man said indignantly that he hadn't seen any signs up forbidding the wearing of caps. At this moment he felt like wearing it. Most decidedly he did not feel like taking it off. There was just a touch of deference in his defiance.

Silently the librarian withdrew.

I found the book on tombstones in the catalogue but not on the shelves. When I returned from the stacks a few minutes later, the young man still sat on the sofa reading, his Midsummer-Night's-Dream cap still on his head.

Why didn't I speak a friendly word to him? Or inquire about him discretely from someone else? Or at least hang around to observe further manifestations of his fresh and independent outlook on life? Hadn't he something more to say on the ever-timely subject of our civil liberties?

Instead, I stupidly walked out the door, got into my car, and drove home. It must have been the heat.

ROBERT FRANCIS

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The Prowler

To leave his empty house yet not to leave it
But make himself a shadow at a window—
Who is this prowler private in the moonlight?

Then at another window and another,
His face against the glass and peering in—
What does he think he sees or wants to see?

Soft as the milkweed floss the September night.
White as the milkweed the untroubled moon
Whose face, though far, is also at the window.

Two faces, but the prowler peers in deeper
Spying upon the empty chair, spying
Upon himself as though still sitting there.

The Whippoorwill

At first we welcomed them. They were so far away
The mimicking of whippoorwill by whippoorwill
Made the still night more still.

And we amused ourselves by trying to count their calls
Then they came nearer, half-way from there to here,
Nearer yet not too near.

Suddenly, very close, one bird had found us out
And rang and rang like an unanswered telephone
In a house left alone.

Why wouldn't it go away and be a bird again?
A swarm of fireflies, gold to green, was the only light
Tinting, taunting the night.

I cannot blame the bird for keeping us awake.
We would not have gone to sleep had there been no whippoorwill
And the night never so still.

ROBERT FRANCIS

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FORUM: *Do Benefit The*

YES!

By JOSEPH C. WILLIAMS

When the bill to extend export controls was considered early in 1949, it was supported by the government and opposed by many branches of American industry. According to the wording of the bill (S. 548):

> Certain materials continue in short supply at home and abroad so that the quantity of United States exports and their distribution among importing countries affects the welfare of the domestic economy and has an important bearing upon the fulfillment of the foreign policy of the United States.
>
> The unrestricted export of materials without regard to their potential military significance may affect the national security.

In its Declaration of Policy, this bill stated that:

> The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the United States to use export controls to the extent necessary (a) to protect the domestic economy from the excessive drain of scarce materials and to reduce the inflationary impact of abnormal foreign demand; (b) to further the foreign policy of the United States and fulfill its international responsibilities; and (c) to exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of their significance to the national security.

BECAUSE of the recurring shortages of vital products and the continuing threat of inflation, it is vital to our economy and to our security to maintain export controls. After World War II shortages in metals and foodstuffs plagued the American economy. A heightening inflation sent black market prices sky-high on all sorts of consumers goods and on many types of sheet metal and other raw materials. Although it was and is the declared intention of the United States to help in the reconstruction of the European economy, this must not be done at the sacrifice of our own standard of living. Therefore, scarce materials must be held here if wanted, despite foreign demand for such items. Responsible government officials must supervise exports for this reason first of all.

Secondly, the abnormal post-war demand created for American goods in Europe would, if unregulated, boost American prices and add to our dangerous inflationary spiral. Finally, the continuing threat to our national security provided by the cold war necessitates supervision of our exports so that no possible military assistance goes to our potential enemies.

The export-control program is administered in the Office of International Trade of the Department of Commerce; early in 1949, this office was handling more than 10,000 applications weekly for export permits of one sort or another. At the Senate hearing on S. 548, Secretary Sawyer of the Commerce Department appeared to explain the program.

> Our statutory authority to control exports is about as broad as it was during the war years. The policies which govern the administration of such controls and the purposes to be accomplished therein are set forth in [the] laws. Generally speaking, they are to protect the domestic economy by limiting exports of scarce materials, and to channel exports to countries where need is greatest and where our foreign-policy interest would be best served.
>
> Export controls were retained after the war to reduce the inflationary affect of abnormal foreign demands upon our supplies. . . . . We are still faced with shortages in important commodities, particularly in the case of steel-mill products, the nonferrous metals, certain fibers, and chemicals, certain fats and oils, and metals. At the same time, there is an even greater demand for these items abroad than at home. And, while most countries of the world are short of dollars and have established their own import and exchange controls, such controls are generally not applicable to the foregoing types of commodities. In other words, in

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Export Controls American Economy?

NO!

By INEZ FRENCH

EXPORT-controls, however well intended, have already done incalculable harm to the American economy and their extension will multiply their dangerous implications. The government control of exports was established immediately after the war because "certain materials continue in short supply." In the resulting "emergency," the Commerce Department was given statutory authority to control exports which, in the words of the department head, Secretary Sawyer, "is about as broad as it was during the war years." The justification for the extension of this arbitrary and dictatorial control is the protection of the American economy. Quite the opposite of export controls, the American economy needs, and needs desperately, a resumption of normal foreign trade.

George F. Bauer, Vice Chairman, International Trade Section, of the New York Board of Trade, summed up the situation at the recent Senate hearing:

> It is the fundamental stand of the international trade section of the New York Board of Trade that export controls are harmful to the conduct of American commerce with other nationals.
>
> Export-controls are contrary to the American way of life and competitive enterprise, if "nations have placed controls over trade," as Assistant Secretary of Commerce Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr., explains:
>
> "Not because they like controls, but because controls seem to be a more desirable method of regulating economic life than submitting businessmen and workers to the adjusting mechanisms of booms, depression, and unemployment."
>
> Export-controls prevent that error in no way.
>
> Export-controls actually are causing reduced employment in enterprises dependent wholly or in part on normal demand abroad for their products or services. They may be extended further to contract job opportunities for Americans when the present abnormal type of foreign trade at the expense of United States taxpayers ceases and until other enterprises can be restored for conduct of normal commerce with other nations on basis of productive and nongovernmentally subsidized transactions and projects. . . .
>
> Export-controls are one of the methods of a statist government. A democracy can hardly oppose such a statist government if in that endeavor it has to employ similarly reprehensible counter measures. The American way found so successful in the past is based on a minimum of controls with extensive efforts of labor, management, and investors to put more and more goods and services of all kinds within the buying reach of the greatest number of people everywhere.

Many American industries need export markets to keep alive. As Roy M. Cohen of the *Butchers' Advocate* pointed out, "even before World War I, we could not normally consume the fats produced in this country without free and liberal exports." Yet, at the time of the hearings, export controls on fats had kept them out of the world market.

Because of United States support prices on agricultural commodities, exports are also seriously hampered. In the course of his testimony on the cottonseed oil situation, T. H. Gregory, of the National Cottonseed Products Association, called attention to the following facts. There is a government support price on beans (soybeans), and on peanuts, and the peanut price in this country is $320 a ton. For this reason, Italians in need of peanuts bought them in South America, as Mr. Gregory pointed out:

"For $265 a ton, and the only reason I can give for that is that the Italians did not want to use their E.C.A. dollars as they had free dollars and they bought these peanuts from South America for their free dollars. If they buy them from us they have to pay $320."

Senator Maybank, chairman of the committee, inquired:

"They could buy more peanuts in South

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the absence of our controls, exports of these commodities would probably be greater than at present.

The determination of what commodities shall be controlled and the fixing of export quotas are the responsibility of the Secretary of Commerce, but the decisions on such matters are made only after extensive review by interagency committees on which all interested departments are represented. . . .

Although some commodities have become more plentiful (see below), many are still in very short supply. Because of the continuing steel shortage, almost all steel products are now under export controls, although in 1947 less than half the steel tonnage exported was under control. For the year 1947 as a whole, shipments overseas totalled 6.5 million tons, or 10.3 per cent of our total steel supply. But by the fourth quarter of 1948, the annual rate of exports was down to 3.3 million tons, or 4.8 per cent of the total supply. (In the immediate pre-war period, exports constituted 7.6 per cent).

STEEL

Fortunately for our immediate needs, substantial increases have been made in foreign steel production. Exports of steel from the United Kingdom were back to their pre-war level in 1948, and our chief pre-war competitors, Belgium and Luxembourg, had raised their exports substantially above pre-war levels.

Nonferrous metals have posed a problem. According to a Commerce Department statement:

The nonferrous metals, copper, zinc, lead, tin and aluminum, currently offer the most serious supply problem to the United States. The world-wide scarcity, the immediate needs of the strategic stock-pile, the expanded military programs, the high level of domestic industrial activity, and continued foreign demands indicate that the shortage of nonferrous metals will not be overcome in the near future.

The increasing pressure on non-ferrous metal supplies during 1948 was reflected in a tightening of export controls. Aluminum plate, sheet, and strip were added to the positive list in August, 1948, because of rapidly expanding domestic demand and a relatively high level of exports. . . .

Although United States crops have in general been excellent, there are also some food items in short supply. According to Albert J. Loveland, Under Secretary of the Agriculture Department, "The Department of Agriculture believes that the extension of export-control authority . . . . is necessary" and that "the protection of our domestic economy alone more than justifies continuation of export controls."

According to figures released by this Department, the current level of exports is running about four times higher than pre-war: "this great increase in exports is dominated by the food component, which is nearly eight times the pre-war rate." Because world food shortages are expected to continue, certainly some foodstuffs will not be ample to provide for all the domestic and all the foreign demand.

World rice requirements, says Mr. Loveland, are for the present calendar year substantially higher than the total world supply. The production of rice in the United States after meeting the needs of our domestic market and the Territories will provide less than one-half million tons of a total world export of three and one-half million tons . . . . relaxation of controls might result in increased procurement by some foreign country to the detriment of our dependent Territories and domestic trade. The pattern of procurement by foreign countries might well be such as to disrupt our shipments to our normal export markets and thereby prove injurious to the interests of the producers and the rice trade in general. . . .

Fats, oils, meats, and fertilizers are also in short supply here in 1949. In 1948, for example, meat exports were held to token shipments of a fraction of one per cent of our production.

Draining off scarce items from the domestic market is one obvious danger of exports at this time; inflation is an equally serious threat to our economy. According to the Department of Agriculure: "Although there has been improvement in the economic conditions in most foreign countries, they are still confronted with shortages which buoy up the demand for certain commodities from the United States. In addition, the prices of many commodities in foreign countries are higher than in the United States.

"Removal of export controls could turn loose a demand for United States commodi-

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ties in short world supply which, in turn, would inflate the prices of these commodities."

For example, "unrestricted demands on the rice supplies of the United States could . . . . result in unwarranted speculative price increases." Unlimited meat exports would certainly have the same effect.

In addition to these protections of the American standard of living, it is necessary for the government to regard exports as an integral part of the United States foreign policy.

As Mr. Loveland pointed out at the Senate hearings:

> The responsibilities of the United States have become world-wide. The United States participated in the international allocation of food through its membership in the International Emergency Food Committee of the Food and Agriculture Organization. It appears that the only feasible manner in which we can fulfill our responsibilities with respect to international allocations of food and related products is to retain export controls to enable us to channel our exports of these commodities to those countries which are in the direst circumstances and which have the greatest need for such food. This is a far more equitable system than the alternative of letting those with the most dollars buy what food is available on the world market and it gives economic stability both here and abroad.
>
> In some countries food shortages are retarding economic recovery and preventing stable political development. We believe that it has been demonstrated that international cooperation in food distribution is essential to international cooperation in other fields where mutual action is necessary.
>
> . . . . Without continuing export controls, it would not be possible to insure distribution of our available export supplies to those countries who are cooperating with us in the fight for world peace and security. . . .

Export controls are necessary to our foreign policy because they permit us to ship goods to our friends and allies in need; but they are equally vital because they allow us to stop shipment of strategic materials to our potential enemies. As Mr. Sawyer of the Commerce Department has pointed out:

> From the viewpoint of the national security and our foreign policy . . . . there is increasing need for the continuance of export controls.
>
> The responsibilities assumed by the United States in enacting the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 have only emphasized the importance of export controls. For some time now it has been our general practice to fix individual country quotas upon the basis of relative need. Moreover, since March 1, 1948, we have had under individual licensing control shipments of practically all commodities to all European and certain related destinations. This enables us to keep United States exports to Europe within E.C.A.-approved programs. It is also being used to give a priority, in effect, to the requirements of the participating countries over those of other European countries. . . .
>
> Equally important is the close scrutiny which is thus made possible over shipments of industrial materials which may have direct or indirect military significance. In the light of the growing concern of democratic nations over the policies of the Eastern European nations, it is quite clear that our national security requires the exercise of such controls to complement export controls over arms, ammunition, and implements of war which are administered by the Munitions Control Board and the State Department.
>
> Except for commodities in short supply, shipments to Western Europe are being licensed fairly freely; but shipments to Eastern Europe have been carefully restricted. It must be kept in mind in this connection that while we are maintaining strict control over shipments of materials and equipment having potential military significance, we must also in our own interest seek to continue the flow from that area of essential commodities to the United States and at the same time minimize interference with the necessary expansion of East-West trade in Europe.

Supervision of our export trade for security reasons is enormously difficult. The Mundt amendment to the E.C.A. legislation requires that no material may be sent from the United States for manufacture into finished products moving from west Europe eastward, if the same finished product is denied direct shipment from this country to East Europe. Actually West European countries, such as Britain for example, are shipping goods behind the Iron Curtain which our shippers are denied license for, and to this extent are taking away our markets. Francis McIntyre, Assistant Director of the Office of International Trade in the Department of Commerce, admitted at the Senate hearings that the British were in fact ship-

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ping certain machine tools to East Europe which American exports cannot ship. However, within the bounds of practical administration, the Office of International Trade sees that such incidents are few.

In addition to seeing that no military materials go to our potential enemies, export-control regulations also make it possible to keep certain highly strategic items from export of any kind. Mr. McIntyre has pointed out that fully half the present list of items under control would be items which the security agencies would not want to see freely exported. There are also "many shipments of items so strategic that they ought not, in the judgment of the security agencies, to go, even though the named destination is not behind the Iron Curtain. In other words, there are many items which the Atomic Energy Commission is unwilling to have exported to any destination."

STRATEGIC ITEMS

These brief excerpts from the Senate committee hearings throw into sharp relief the many reasons why export-controls must be continued. Both our national economy and our national security demand that we maintain these complicated and admittedly distasteful regulations for some time in the future. The administration is very much aware of the dissatisfaction in many circles with the export controls, and the Commerce Department has been quick to recognize changing supply conditions whenever possible. As Secretary Sawyer told the committee:

> The domestic and world supply situation has improved since the end of the war, and particularly during the past year, the first year of the European recovery program. This has been reflected in a substantial reduction in the number of commodities subject to individual export licensing for all destinations. Lumber, poles, plywood, and gypsum board and lath were decontrolled at the end of 1948, as were some chemicals and drugs, including soda ash, caustic soda, and streptomycin. We hope that there will be continued improvement along these lines, but we must recognize that domestic shortages may become worse and these controls should be available to meet such situations.
>
> A significant development in the progressive elimination of controls over commodities formerly in short supply has been the establishment of open-end quotas. Where in the judgment of the interagency committee the domestic supply situation has not improved sufficiently to permit complete decontrol, it is nevertheless frequently possible to secure agreement upon issuance of licenses without quota restrictions against qualified applicants.

The administration, then, does all it can to lift restrictions as the supply situation shifts. As for the actual administration of the program, it is surprisingly efficient. The personnel of the Office is somewhere around 670; and applications for export licenses in late February were around 10,000 weekly (they had formerly been around 20,000 weekly, until certain items like caustic soda were decontrolled, and when dollars were more more plentiful). When applications are received for shipment to Western Europe of commodities over which there is no special concern, they are handled in about five days; applications for goods where there is a long waiting list take two weeks or more.

Naturally enough, exporters chafe at any delay, and individuals occasionally suffer great hardships because of red tape. In industries like steel, we can quote Mr. McIntyre that "the American export community is doing a far larger business in steel to markets outside of Europe than it ever did in its history . . . . it is not losing markets which it had before." But, because there are so many new entrants into the industry, given individuals may be losing business. This can hardly be blamed on export-controls.

Occasionally, as in the recent Senate hearings quoted here, members of a certain industry get together and howl loudly, as did the manufacturers of inedible fats, who claimed they were denied export licenses. Mr. McIntyre claimed, on the contrary, that:

> We had one of those open-end quotas in effect, so that anyone who came forward for a license for inedible tallow, in the last two or three months, could have obtained a license readily and freely. . . . Every application we have received for the past two months or so has been approved.

Within the limits laid down for it, the administrators of the export-control program seem to have done all they could to make it effective. Maladministration would seem to be the only possible charge against the efficacy of the export-control program. If we

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grant the necessity of the Marshall Plan; if we grant the necessity for security precautions against potential aggressors; and if, finally, we grant the dangers implicit in short supplies and inflation—then we must at the same time grant the necessity for export-controls. Today export-controls are necessary and beneficial to the American economy.

(Continued from page 97)

America with their dollars than they can buy from our farmers with our dollars?"

Mr. Gregory answering in the affirmative, Senator Maybank commented that: ". . . . the taxpayers of the United States pay the taxes to give the E.C.A. the dollars and the E.C.A. turns it over to the Italians and lets them use the dollars of the taxpayers in this country to buy peanuts from South America."

Also, as Senator Bricker pointed out, "the taxpayers of this country pay the support price."

This is simply another example of the evil workings of a complex government plan, in this case the price support plan. Its effect on exports is made clear here, and there is no denying that high support prices limit our export trade. Coupled with the export-control system, they combine to put an awful burden on the American economy.

The export-control program unfortunately tends to have an opposite effect, to depress prices in the United States by limiting the world market. Artificially depressed prices are not better for the economy than supported prices. Mr. L. Blaine Liljenquist, representing the Western States Meatpackers, pointed out to the same committee that "Fats and oils producers—farmers, packers, renders and other processors—should not be required by government action to suffer a loss on their fats and oils operations. Indeed, as an overall policy, commodity prices should not go too low or we may be unable to carry our national debt of $250,000,000,000 and an annual federal budget exceeding $40,000,000,000."

Those who support the export-control program contend that the end—the saving of the American economy—justifies this very undemocratic and socialistic means. But even the end is jeopardized by the administration of the program. The Department of Agriculture engages in wholesale guesswork as to future stockpiles, frequently with disastrous results. For example, in 1948 they reportedly estimated ending stocks of inedible fats and oils at 694,000,000 and it turned out to be 788,000,000—a difference of nearly 100,000,000 pounds. The exports were restricted on the basis of the false estimate and the resulting surplus was disastrous.

Another aspect of the export-control regulations equally serious is the interest taken in end use. Because the end use is an important consideration under this program in the exporting of steel, for example, licenses are granted for steel export to particular importers within the country named. At the Senate hearings, Senator Taylor, of Idaho, questioned this policy:

> I would like to ask why you insist that they send to certain consignees down there. What do you care who they send it to as long as it is in the country? Are you interested in their welfare to see that they are not gypped?

Mr. Sweeney, of the Office of International Trade, explained that:

> There are a number of plants that are being built . . . . about which we have reports from the Foreign Service of the United States, who should receive some priority because of the nature of the construction going on down there [South America].

This may be so, yet as Senator Taylor pointed out:

> It would seem to me that this affords a wonderful opportunity for graft and favoritism to certain people in South America who might have connections in this country—this business of shipping to certain consignees.

Although it is the earnest wish of the United States government that this is not the case, it scarcely seems possible that the human element does not enter in.

The export-control program may also be favoring several large companies at the expense of smaller ones, or one industry at the expense of another. Take, for example, the restrictions on the export of inedible fats. Because these items have a very limited home market, their price has fallen in relation to the lack of foreign demand. Those who buy

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inedible fats in this country, therefore, can buy today at a low price which is maintained artificially. Who are these buyers? Mr. Benjamin Cohen assured the Senate Committee that "the three large soap manufacturers absolutely and definitely control the inedible tallow market of the nation." On request, for the record, Mr. Cohen supplied their names: "Proctor and Gamble, Lever Brothers, Colgate-Palmolive-Peet." As Mr. Cohen and other witnesses representing the tallow interests pointed out, there has been no decrease in the price of soaps and soap flakes proportionate to the decreases in the prices of their ingredients (reported to be aproximately one-third of the price a year before).

Undoubtedly, it is no coincidence that the soap manufacturers have pressed for the retention of export controls, and for restrictions on the export of inedible fats.

SHORTAGES

This is a case in which one industry obviously benefits at the expense of another and at the expense, incidentally, of the soap-using consumer. In other instances, smaller companies in an industry suffer from the export-control program. As Wilbur La Roe, Jr., of the National Independent Meat Packers pointed out: "One of our practical difculties is that some of our competitors maintain branch houses or agencies in Cuba and other foreign countries, and they can and do obtain export licenses which place them in a position to sell these commodities at the world market price, placing the small packers at a disadvantage who do not have these plants and agencies in other nations."

No amount of wise administration can eliminate such defects of an artificial export control program. But, say its advocates, goods in short supply must be controlled or there will be shortages and inflation in this country.

Curiously enough, representatives of most industries responsible for "goods in short supply" deny that shortages exist or are serious enough to warrant export control. Among those who appeared at the Senate hearings were representatives of the cotton and wheat growers, the steel and oil industries, and livestock and fats, both edible and inedible.

Mr. H. E. Sanford, of the National Grain Trade Council stated:

> . . . We have agreed that there was good reason for the government handling of grain exports during the war, although even then we believed that exporting could have been performed privately, as evidenced by the fact that it was done so in Canada. . . . We felt that the arguments were less strong during the early post-war years, but rested more or less content with the assurance that it was a temporary arrangement during the food-shortage crisis.
>
> Last summer it became apparent that the actual emergency was over.

Nevertheless, private trading in grain has not been encouraged as yet because of the boxcar shortage. "We do not consider that those obstacles are insurmountable," declared Mr. Sanford, pleading for the decontrol of grain exports. Export-controls on the Commodity Credit Corporation cotton surplus of 5,000,000 bales are also ineffective.

There can be no doubt that the grain problem of the United States today is one of surplus and not of shortage. According to Mr. Sanford, the Department of Agriculture asked farmers to hold their wheat acreage down last year (1948) and this year we read further suggestions for acreage restriction.

Russell B. Brown, of the Independent Petroleum Association of America, contributed a similar story on behalf of the oil producers.

> The occasion for such restrictions [export-controls] does not exist at the present time as far as the supply of oil is concerned. In fact, the reverse is true. If the purpose of the bill before your committee is to protect the domestic economy and further and protect the national security, this purpose would be served most directly by a control over imports of oil rather than over exports. . . .

During the war, the oil producers were encouraged to step up production, and their continuing high production has no market in this country. The oil industry should be encouraged to operate at capacity and to supply foreign markets in peacetime.

Mr. Alfred H. Benjamin, of the Anglo-American Trading Corporation, appeared at the hearings to protect export controls in general. Pointing to the grey market in steel, he declared that:

"There is no shortage of steel in this coun-

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try. That is a bogey." He quotes *The New York Times* and the chairman of the United Steel Corporation as recognizing that there is a softening in many lines of steel. Mr. Benjamin told the committee that, "Lack of steel is a bogey, what is not available for the merchant exporter is available in the grey market at $50 per ton over the mill price. "Who," he demanded, "received the rake-off?"

That there is no shortage of inedible fats and oils in the United States is now generally recognized; yet before controls were lifted the price of these products had fallen to a new low. A. L. Durand, of the National Cottonseed Products, revealed at the hearings that:

"Cottonseed meal from the 1947 crop sold at a high of about $100 a ton. By November, 1948, the price had declined to about $80 per ton and the current price is about $58 to $60 per ton. On January 1, 1949, according to the Bureau of the Census reports, about 500,000 tons of cottonseed were yet to be marketed. Both the processors who have bought the bulk of the crop and the farmer who has not yet marketed all of his cottonseed are faced with ruinous losses.

"The only relief from these burdensome surpluses is, in our judgment, through greatly increased exports."

The representatives of the edible and inedible fat industries also protested at length against the encouraging of fat *imports,* thus adding to the unmarketable surplus in this country.

From the viewpoint of a great many American industries, export-controls are undesirable. The red tape and bureaucratic delay which accompanies controls is also injurious to our economy. As Louis I. Freed, of the Independent Merchant Exporters, pointed out to the committee:

> . . . a combination of poorly considered administrative decisions, *ex post facto* regulations, and partiality to the prime producers has acted to force many small exporters out of business. Many of those who remain in business have turned to items or products not on the positive list.

It is clear then, that the small exporters, as well as small businessmen as a whole, and many whole industries, are feeling the harmful effects of continuing export-controls. The creation of a state controlled economy is no part of our national or international policy. Those who advocate that the end justifies the means should remember this. Export-controls are throwing our economic system out of balance; they are exercising a harmful and highly artificial influence on supply and demand and on our price structure. Not until export controls are abandoned will the American economy be able to try to return to normal.

Field Marshall Viscount Alexander was in Hollywood recently, and while there he visited a film studio. He was in uniform. So were some of the actors waiting to go on the movie set.

Lord Alexander was talking to them when an assistant producer came along, looked at his ribbons, and remarked doubtfully: "Say, buddy, I think the wardrobe department may have overdone it."

Before the actors could put the film man right, Lord Alexander replied: "Maybe they did—maybe they did."

—*Montreal Star* (Canada)

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More Than

FIFTY YEARS OF FORUM

Criticisms of the press in 1886 caused a FORUM contributor to compose an article entitled "Newspapers Gone to Seed." The author, James Parton, assumes in his article both an offensive and defensive attitude toward the press. In an offensive thrust, Mr. Parton, like Ferdinand Hermens in this month's FORUM, attacks the headline habits of editors. Albeit Mr. Parton's charges are not quite as serious as Mr. Hermens':

"Perhaps, of all the people in the world, the class which derives least good from journalism are journalists themselves. Absorbed as they are in the most intense and often fascinating labors, they are apt to remain in strange ignorance of the very public to which they minister. . . . They are like medical students who see daily before their eyes the dissected remains of two or three hundred human bodies. What can they know of the many-sided awfulness of death, and the unutterable pangs of bereavement. . . . The journalist is occupied every hour with events which carry misery and despair to large numbers of his fellow beings and he gradually loses all sense of the hideous impropriety which he commits in hot haste at a quarter past one in the morning when he writes at the top of a page of horrors, 'Three Bibulous Suicides.' If by some miracle the conductors of certain newspapers could read one number of their journals with the reader's eyes, they would turn away with affright; they would either abandon their profession or reform it. I am thinking at this moment of those columns in the weekly edition of a New York paper which ministers to its readers' prurient curiosity, and of that assignation column in a journal of Cincinnati, which is a blot upon the whole valley of the Missisippi."

Assuming a defensive air, Mr. Parton extols the merits of the daily press. We might infer that the advice given is—Burn your colleges but not your newspapers!

"Journalists naturally resent the recent criticism of the outside world, much of which has been thoughtless and unjust. Men of experience in that profession know that their art, easy as it may seem to those who know nothing of it, is as special as watchmaking, and infinitely more difficult. . . . Our aggressive and enterprising race has never attempted anything in which success was more improbable. We cannot wonder that honest and able men, working assiduously at this task day by day, should regard with derision, or anger the attempts of their readers to give them advice or reproof.

Nothing could excuse it by the public importance of the work they attempt. The daily press is the people's university. Half of the readers of Christendom read little else. If we had to choose which should be destroyed, all our colleges or all our daily papers, we should be obliged to decide that our colleges are of immeasurable value, but that the daily press is indispensable. It is like the water system of a continent into which everything is thrown, clean and unclean, things fertilizing and things poisonous, demoniac anarchism, gentle philanthropy, scandal, Gladstone, Talmage, Tennyson, Downs and the sawdust thief; but the streams flow on becoming purer and clearer as they widen and deepen. Gentlemen of the press, therefore, must accept their vocation of public functionaries with all that the character implies. They must expect to be scolded and lectured by persons who know little or nothing of the inner mysteries of their craft. . . ."

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CONGRESS DEBATES:

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

WHEN it became increasingly evident that the Soviet Union would not cooperate with the Western Powers in the United Nations and was looking towards expansion, the United States adopted a policy of "containment" of the Soviet Union. The most important instrument of the American policy of containing Russia was the Marshall Plan. Finally with the advent of the Russian blockade of Berlin it was felt that something stronger was needed to remind the Soviets that they were overstepping their bounds. This feeling culminated in the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington on April 4. In this treaty, the 12 contracting nations—the United States, Canada, Denmark, Portugal, Iceland, Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, and Luxembourg—banded together for defense in the case of an armed attack upon one of them.

The initiative in this treaty was taken by the United States, and from beginning to end, Congress took a keen interest in the negotiations. It was the Senate Resolution 239 passed on June 11, 1948, which started the actual negotiations on their way. This resolution advised the President that he should pursue "association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affects its national security" and contribution "to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 [of the United Nations Charter] should any armed attack occur affecting its national security."

Throughout the negotiations for the pact bi-partisan Senatorial advice and opinion was sought. It was the Senators who objected to the original draft of article 5 of the treaty. This article obligated the signatories to aid by the use of armed force any member who was the victim of aggression. This, the Senators argued, was unconstitutional—the Constitution grants to Congress alone the power to declare war. A compromise was finally reached in which the use of armed force was left to the discretion of the individual nations.

When the Treaty came up for ratification in the Senate, article 3 was the main point of contention. The most influential opponent of the Treaty was Senator Robert A. Taft, Republican, of Ohio, who stated that this article committed us to the arming of the European members of the pact. Others asserted that the Treaty ran counter to the United Nations Charter. There were even a few old-fashioned isolationists left in the Senate who objected to the pact. But despite these objections, the Senate ratified the North Atlantic Treaty by an overwhelming vote of 82 to 13.

FORUM presents below excerpts from the speeches made by Republican Senators Taft and Vandenberg illustrating the main arguments made for and against the ratification of the Treaty. This debate is also an interesting illustration of the conflicts between the two leading Republican policy leaders:[1]

* * * *

Mr. VANDENBERG, Republican, Michigan. Mr. President, I present to the Senate my urgent reasons for supporting the pending North Atlantic Treaty. I believe it is the best available implement to discourage armed aggression and thus to stop another war before it starts.

[1] *The Congressional Record, Senate*, Vol. 95, No. 120, pp. 9065-9071; No. 123, pp. 9383-9388.

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I recognize there are conscientious differences of opinion on this subject in Congress and the country. Eliminating some self-serving opposition which is clearly inspired by alien influence, I have the greatest respect for the earnest questions that have been raised, in and out of Congress, by loyal citizens whom I do not for an instant confuse with these other opponents to whom I have referred. They perform a public service by putting this treaty to the test. In such circumstance, the treaty must justify itself. I know it can.

. . . . . .

My view is that this treaty is the most sensible, powerful, practicable, and economical step the United States can now take in the realistic interest of its own security; in the effective discouragement of aggressive conquest which would touch off world war three; in the stabilization of Western Germany; and, as declared by its own preamble, in peacefully safeguarding the freedoms and the civilization founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. These things, Mr. President, I shall undertake to prove.

Only those without eyes to see and ears to hear can deny that these precious values—far dearer than life itself—are in jeopardy in today's tortured world. It is the overriding fact of life. Sooner or later every other problem is overshadowed by it. It is a condition, not a theory. It must be met as such. That is what this pending treaty undertakes to do.

. . . . . .

Is it not elementary common sense, Mr. President, for those who share this jeopardy also to share vigilance against it? That is what this treaty does. It reduces the jeopardy by anticipating it. It reduces the jeopardy by sharing it. Indeed, it may well extinguish the jeopardy—and I believe it will—by the clear demonstration that this united self-defense against aggression will be invincible. Upon two previous occasions the Kaiser and the Fuehrer found this out the hard way. This treaty ought to make a renewal of the lesson, in blood and sweat and tears, unnecessary. Certainly it is worth the chance.

There is no hypothesis of honorable peace, Mr. President, into which the North Atlantic Treaty does not fit. It stands in the way of nothing but armed aggressors. It cannot possibly handicap any successful peace efforts in other directions. It can only supplement and strengthen them—always and forever a reserve reliance, and nothing else—always and forever subordinate to the happy evolution of dependable progress in the United Nations, in the Councils of Foreign Ministers, and in the friendlier habits of presently dangerous neighbors.

It is anxiously said by some, Mr. President, that the treaty is a sharp departure from our historic American foreign policy of non-entanglement in the affairs of others. In a sense this may be true. In another sense it is not. We might remember that the philosophy of action upon which this treaty is based is one of the reasons for the formation of our own federal union as asserted in the Federalist Papers, namely to make it possible "to apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular part." We might remember that our own Monroe Doctrine was the pioneer in the preventive doctrine of warning aggressors to keep off the grass. We might remember that it worked. We might remember World War I and World War II. We might remember our membership in the United Nations where we pledge ourselves to collective security no less emphatically than we do in the pending pact.

We might also remember, Mr. President, that times have changed. Once upon a time the oceans were moats around our bastions. Once upon a time it was a miracle to travel round the world in 90 days. Now it is done in as many hours. We might compare old-fashioned muskets with new-fashioned bombs. Once upon a time we were a comfortably isolated land. Now we are unavoidably the leader and the reliance of freemen throughout this free world. We cannot escape from our prestige nor from its hazard.

. . . . . .

Now, Mr. President, before we examine the treaty itself, let us see how and why it is here At the end of two world wars, neither of which we entered voluntarily, we found ourselves unavoidably burdened with

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obligations to help administer the victory and the pursuit of peace. Our unliquidated obligations still persist, and so do their unliquidated tasks.

We also found ourselves in the heart and center of a foreshortened world. This was, and is, as plain as that two and two makes four. The flight of a guided missile, the chain reaction of an atomic bomb, the range of an air-pirate, these are hazards which reduce international boundaries to the impotence of pencil marks on tissue paper. There is no longer such a thing as isolated security.

Like the practical people that we are, we faced these hard facts of life. We did it not in the glow of global evangelism but on the cold, hard basis of intelligent self-interest. We sought to make ourselves safe in a world of peace and justice. Long before the shooting stopped, we made preliminary soundings at Dumbarton Oaks to find a working basis upon which to seek cooperation for international peace and security. This led eventually to San Francisco and the United Nations Charter. It was not an ideal Charter, thanks to limitations inherited from Yalta, and to clashing ideologies which began to display their incompatibilities before the ink on the charter was even dry. But it was a hopeful charter, frankly requiring a common will and a mutual faith among the Great Powers, one of which promptly began its long, reckless, and relentless destruction of this unity. It was a charter to which the American people overwhelmingly subscribed, as reflected in the Senate's ratification on July 28, 1945, by a vote of 89 to 2. I hasten to add, Mr. President, that it is still a hopeful charter despite all Soviet "road blocks." It has done probably much for peace. I hesitate to think where the world would be today if its council table had not been available to talk things out, no matter how inconclusively, rather than to shoot them out.

Mr. President, in the process of forging the United Nations at the Golden Gate it speedily became evident that the regional arrangements initially proposed, textually offered special latitudes of security to our European allies which were denied to others of us and particularly to Pan America. The former were permitted their own summary enforcement action "in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy" on the part of any of the Axis states. But the Americas, in their regional arrangements, were entirely at the mercy of the Security Council—with its veto—in the event of trouble under the Act of Chapultepec, which proposed, once for all, to establish the essence of the Monroe Doctrine as a mutual partnership.

To make a long story short, Latin-America rebelled—and so did we. If the omission had not been rectified there would have been no Charter. It was rectified, finally, after infinite travail, by agreement upon article 51 of the Charter. Nothing in the Charter is of greater immediate importance and nothing in the Charter is of equal potential importance.

ARTICLE 51

It recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Note well that language. The right of individual or collective self-defense is specifically acknowledged, in the event of armed attack, as an inherent and paramount right which goes with sovereignty and which continues unless and until the United Nations Security Council "has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."

The Security Council may be paralyzed by a veto, as it has been in the past by 30 Soviet vetoes; but under article 51 no veto can paralyze individual or collective self-defense against armed attack. It follows, as day follows night, that regional or other collective arrangements can be made by congenial nations—strictly within the framework of the Charter—to organize "collective self-defense" against an unhappy and unwanted day of crisis.

That, Mr. President, is precisely what we did, among other things, for the Western Hemisphere when we wrote the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance at Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947, which the Senate of the United States ratified on December 8, 1947, by a vote of 72 to 1. We thus established well-nigh invincible security for our New World.

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Again, Mr. President, that is what we were talking about in a larger sphere when, on June 11, 1948, the Senate, by a vote of 64 to 4, advised the President that he should pursue "association of the United States by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affects its national security" and contribution "to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national sceurity." If we did not have at the time we passed that resolution something like the pending pact in mind, what did we have in mind?

All this now comes to climax, Mr. President, in the pending North Atlantic Treaty. It is a series of logical progressions. We wrote "collective self-defense" into the United Nations Charter at San Francisco. We applied it to Pan America at Rio. We advised the President, in Senate Resolution 239 of the Eightieth Congress, to explore these peace potentials in a wider area. He took our advice. The pending treaty to protect the North Atlantic community is the result.

The result, in my opinion, is the greatest discouragement to war which we have yet devised. In my opinion, it makes the United Nations Charter work despite the Charter's crippling handicaps. In my opinion, it points the way to make the Charter work for keeps regardless of continuing subversion by a Communist minority. It has no aim but peace. No nation on this earth need lose so much as one night's sleep over its purposes or its ultimate impact unless that nation plans voluntarily to identify itself as an international criminal by armed aggression against its peace-loving neighbors. But if such there be, here is the warrant for its doom.

I have referred to Senate Resolution 239 passed just one year ago by a vote of 64 to 4. I have said that it asked for this North Atlantic Pact. That is my opinion in respect to the sequence. But I hasten to repeat what I said one year ago. Every Senator is free to judge the sequence for himself. In good faith I said then to my colleagues that they could vote for Senate Resolution 239 without any commitment, moral or otherwise, to any particular implementation which might subsequently be submitted to their judgments. In good faith I repeat it now. I shall never ask any Senator to vote for the North Atlantic Pact because he voted for Senate Resolution 239. But I shall urge all Senators prayerfully to consider whether this sort of sequence is not the objective we then envisioned. Without regard to sequence, I shall urge that this is "tops" in practical pacifism for western civilization in general and for our own United States of America in particular.

The treaty is here for another reason. We have not finished World War II until the German problem is settled. There can be neither peace nor economic stability in Western Europe until the German problem is liquidated. There can be no release for us from our own burdensome occupational responsibilities in Western Germany until free and self-sufficient government is re-established in these areas. This means, on the one hand, that the Germans must have a reasonable and hopeful opportunity to build a sound and healthy economy for themselves and to resume their place in the family of nations. But it requires, on the other hand, that this recovery shall not restore the aggressive military potential which, twice in our lives, has plunged the world in war.

This time there must be no mistakes upon this score. Germany's immediate neighbors cannot be blamed for special solicitude in this respect. They cannot be blamed for insisting that German recovery must be subordinate to these protections. To meet this elementary need, we offered our Allies, including the Soviets, a 40-year treaty of support in the event of Axis resurgence. The Soviets spurned the proposal. I assume it is still open to them. In lieu thereof, we have now signed this pending 20-year pact with our Western allies. For them and us it accomplishes, among other things, the same result. It would apply just as promptly and effectively to a German aggressor as it does to a Communist aggressor. But by the same token it also is a powerful and well-nigh indispensable aid to maximum German recovery—and therefore to European recovery—because it per-

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mits greater recovery latitudes than Germany's twice-ravished neighbors would otherwise tolerate.

Let me summarize the pact in a few simple sentences.

This is a peace agreement between 12 independent nations and 300,000,000 people who assert their purpose to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. They reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

These 12 nations, I repeat for the record, are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. What is their contract?

THE TREATY

First. They covenant to settle any international disputes, in which they may be involved, by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered.

Second. They agree to cooperate toward better international understandings to eliminate conflict and to encourage collaboration.

Third. They agree, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, to maintain and develop their individual and collective potentials to resist armed attack.

Fourth. They agree to consult together whenever the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any one of them is threatened.

Fifth. They agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an armed attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as each deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Such measures shall cease when the Security Council of the United Nations takes competent jurisdiction.

Sixth. They agree to establish an advisory council, upon which each of them shall be represented, to consider implementation of the treaty. The council has no power of action. Its power is solely to recommend.

Seventh. They provide that the treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. I emphasize the fact that this qualifying phrase refers not only to the process of ratification but to the process of implementation.

The treaty is subject to revision in ten years and to denouncement in 20 years. Its geographical jurisdiction is confiined to Europe, North America, the French metropolitan areas of Algeria, and islands north of the Tropic of Cancer.

It is thus short, plain, and simple. It involves some debatable implications to which I shall give subsequent frank attention. But the controlling theme is as concise and straightforward as my summary indicates. It is purely a self-defensive compact which serves advance notice upon any aggressor that 300,000,000 people in the North Atlantic community propose neither to appease nor surrender to aggression against the "rich heritage of the Western World," as one analyst has put it; that "brilliant civilization based on Greek humanism, Roman legal thinking, Christian ethics, and the great common experience of the Renaisance, all binding us together in a peace-loving community of free thought and free endeavor" which we mean to uphold and, if it should be necessary, to defend.

There is not one aggressive syllable in the entire contract. There is nothing but peace in the aspirations which give it being and in the self-help and mutual aid which give it life. It is not built to stop a war after it starts—although its potentialities in this regard are infinite. It is built to stop wars before they start. With greatest respect for the counter views of sincere Americans who argue otherwise—but with complete contempt for the hostile, self-serving, self-confessing hysteria against it by communism everywhere—I shall urge the Senate that this is the logical evolution of one of our greatest American idioms, "United we stand, divided we fall."

I want to come back, Mr. President, to the charge that this North Atlantic Pact is a

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repitition of the old military alliances as menacingly known to history, and that it thus flies in the face of all our own precious national tradition. I submit one exhibit bearing upon both, and answering both.

Perhaps the most significant of all the old, orthodox military alliances was the Holy Alliance of 1815. Perhaps the most significant of all our own American doctrines was the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which was first announced to the world within these very hallowed walls where we now meet. The Holy Alliance and the Monroe Doctrine were just eight years apart. The latter was substantially stimulated by the threats to America inherent in the former. I think by a very brief analysis of the two I can indicate conclusively why there is not a scintilla of justification for confusing the thing we are here asked to do with this thing of ancient menace.

MILITARY ALLIANCES

Let me read one tell-tale, controlling sentence from the Holy Alliance: "The three contracting monarchs will remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity, and, considering each other as fellow countrymen, they will on all occasions and in all places lend each other aid and assistance."

It was a contract for weal or woe—on all occasions and in all places—regardless of provocations—regardless of right or wrong—to stand and fight together for the survival of these monarchies. It was a self-serving alliance against the world. It was both defensive and aggressive. It was a contract not only for survival but for domination.

Can you find any remote semblance of a parallel in the North Atlantic Treaty which is dedicated solely to peace; which applies solely to mutual resistance against an aggressor's armed attack; which is devoid of a single imperialistic obligation; and which is instantly null and void when the conscience of the world is prepared to function through the Security Council of the United Nations? This is not a military alliance in any historical and orthodox meaning of that phrase.

Then let me read, on the other hand, two sentences from the Monroe Doctrine:

> We owe it to candor—

And when that phrase was used it was simply the forerunner of what we now mean when we so often indicate that in conducting the public foreign policy of the United States the government should say what it means and mean what it says.

> We owe it to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers (referring to contemplated American colonization by European powers) to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and security. * * * With the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny * * * in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

Just what were we thus doing on our own responsibility back in those swaddling days of the Republic, Mr. President? In net effect were we not doing exactly what we propose, on a multilateral basis, to do today? Were we not frankly warning potential aggressors in advance that if they aggressed they would have to cope with us? Were we not choosing the lesser of calculated risks? Were we not expecting that the warning of the consequences of an aggression would save us from the unavoidable necessity of stopping the aggression if it occurred? In familiar idiom, I repeat, were we not saying—"keep off the grass?"

An even better idiom was offered to the Senate yesterday in the able address by my distinguished friend, the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY], when he phrased it as an analogy with the traffic warning, Do Not Enter. The traffic warning, Do Not Enter, stands upon 10,000 corners of this land. There is not a policeman standing by the sign anywhere, but the sign usually is effective. There has to be a reasonable constabulary in the background. But the sign carries its own power.

Mr. President, that warning worked—to the glory of the Republic and to the everlasting promotion of righteous peace. With only incidental lapse, it protected the New World through practically a century of peace. It spoke with candor. It said what it

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meant. It meant what it said. It prevented trouble by frankly pointing out the price of trouble. No aggressor was willing to pay the price. It did not rely on armed forces in being deployed throughout the far-flung area which it sought to immunize against aggression. It relied upon something infinitely more powerful and more impressive. It relied upon the assurance to any potential aggressor that he would face odds calculated to cost him any chance of victory. It did not precipitate war. It precipitated and maintained independent peace.

Mr. President, the North Atlantic Pact may be a literal departure from orthodox American diplomacy although George Washington's justly revered Farewell Address visualized temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies—and I do not know how any emergency could be more extraordinary than our dire need to stop total atomic war before it starts again, and I think a treaty which is subject to review in ten years is relatively temporary compared with the decades of inexpressible grief which the fealure of peace would grind into our broken lives. But I deny that the treaty is a departure from a philosophy of preventive action against aggression which was bravely and wisely and successfully launched by our own prescient forbears 126 years ago in Washington, D. C. I deny that it has any kinship with military alliances as they were known in the old and ominous sense. I assert, on the basis of our own American experience with candor under the Monroe Doctrine that it is more calculated to encourage peace and to prevent the insane events which would make peace impossible, pact or no pact, than any other recourse which we could presently embrace.

I know, Mr. President, there are many friends of this great peace adventure who are inclined to put their overriding emphasis upon the subsequent physical implementation of the pact. There are those who count it disingenuous to take any other view.

I do not agree. Frankly, I should have much less interest in this treaty if I thought its repressive influence for peace is measured by or dependent on any such implementation. It is not the military forces in being which measure the impact of this "knock-out" admonition. In my view its invincible power for peace is the awesome fact that any aggressor upon the North Atlantic community knows in advance that from the very moment he launches his conquest he will forthwith face whatever cumulative opposition these united allies in their own wisdom deem necessary to beat him to his knees and to restore peace and security.

It is not the military forces in being which measure the impact of this "knock-out" admonition, important though they are. It is the potential which counts, and any armed aggressor knows that he forthwith faces this potential from the moment he attacks. It is this total concept which, in my view, would give even a reincarnated Hitler pause.

ARTICLE 3

Let me not be misunderstood. I accept the philosophy of article 3 for myself. I simply insist upon the proper context. We are not launching a vast arms race. Quite the contrary—we largely depend upon potentials.

Article 3 is elementary common sense in that the parties to this treaty propose, separately and jointly, by means of continuous self-help and mutual aid, to develop their individual and collective potentials to resist armed attack. It is common sense to put these common interests in gear in the exercise of common vigilance. The better they are integrated the less the need for their expansion and the less likelihood of their subsequent use.

What is proposed under article 3 for the next year? I do not know except by general information, that we may be asked for something like $1 billion of arms aid to supplement six or seven billions which our associated nations have already provided in their own budgets. The immediate objective, I understand, is substantially to make existing forces more efficient—to standardize rather than to expand.

By no stretch of the imagination can such a prospectus be deemed aggressive. Nor can it be deemed competitive. Nor can it be deemed a plan to turn Western Europe into an armed camp. Nor can it be deemed to contemplate new American manpower overseas. Nor, Mr. President, can it be deemed —and this is the vital thing to me—to measure the final authority which this agreement

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shall exercise to dissuade aggressors from their crimes. The supreme authority for peace is in the potentials of the treaty itself. It is in article 5 and not in article 3.

I want to repeat again, however, that I understand that article 3 has its very definite and unavoidable importance. It builds no illusory Maginot lines. But it steps up the defense facilities in being. It contributes to security and to the sense of security. It certainly discourages armed aggression by proxy, which is to say by internal treason. It betokens the fact that the treaty "means business" in its mutual purpose to prevent aggression. But I reserve to myself, as will every Senator, the right to pass independent judgment on the nature and extent of this supplementary legislation.

Just what is our obligation at this point? I take it no one would pretend that the ratification of the pact does not make some sort of alteration in the situation as it exists without the pact. Its articles are not meaningless. But the timing and the nature and extent of implementing legislation, in this or any other year, are, in my opinion, wide open to the free decision of all Senators as to what they believe the objectives of the pact and the national security require. The Secretary of State's statement is:

> The pact does not dictate the conclusion of honest judgment * * * it does preclude repudiation of the principle or of the obligation of making that honest judgment * * * there is an obligation to help, but the extent, the manner, and the timing is up to the honest judgment of the parties.

I shall feel free to argue with my colleagues on the merits of any such issues when they arise. But I shall never argue that their vote for the pact precludes free and honest judgment and independence in any such subsequent event.

Much the same sort of question arises under article 5. Senators will observe that I am now seeking to survey the moot points that have arisen. Since this article says that "an armed attack upon one shall be considered an armed attack upon all," does this automatically commit us to war? It commits us, according to the text, to take forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, "such action as we deem necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." A commitment to take notice and to do something about it is automatic. A commitment to war is not. Indeed, the textual phrase "including the use of armed force" obviously indicates that there are many other alternatives, just as there are in the United Nations Charter.

Everything depends upon the nature of the event. A minor aggression might be stopped by a vigorous warning. An instant appeal to the Security Council of the United Nations might succeed and suffice. If the Security Council defaults, the so-called pacific sanctions described in the Charter might be applied by the partners under the pact. In other words, what might be called an "aggressive incident," or perhaps a "provoked incident" as some fear, as distinguished from an all-out, clearly deliberate act of conquest, could be met with a multitude and variety of devices far short of war. This is important because these so-called "incidents" have often historically led to war. At such a moment, the pact's potential should exercise incalculable influence for peace.

OBLIGATIONS

But suppose the event is obviously of major and deliberate magnitude and clearly discloses a criminal aggressor deliberately on the march—as Hitler entered Poland or as the Kaiser entered Belgium. Let us say that it is clearly the dread thing which threatens the life and freedom of one of our associated nations, if not ourselves directly. If it is, it threatens the life and freedom of every other associated nation, including our own. If it is, it threatens total war or total surrender, pact or no pact. If it is, our commitment is clear as crystal. It is to take whatever action we deem necessary to maintain the security of the North Atlantic area, which vividly includes the security of the United States. If the only action adequate is war, then it means war. If it does mean war, I venture to assert that, pact or no pact, it would mean war for us anyway in this foreshortened world. If it does mean war, I venture to say that we would be infinitely better off for having instant and competent allies. But if it does mean war, only Congress itself, under the specific terms of the pact, can declare it.

But then comes the next question. Who

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would decide for us what we would deem to be necessary under such bitter circumstances? The Constitution says that only Congress can declare war. The Constitution also makes the President the Commander in Chief of our armed forces. As such, he can use—and many times has used—the armed forces to defend American life and property and security without a declaration of war. Since treaties are the supreme law of the land, would it not be his duty, under the extreme circumstances last indicated, to act instantly in defense of that pledge? I think the answer is "Yes." But he has a wide area of discretion, always short of war, in which to act, and he can only act within his constitutional authority, which is neither increased nor diminished by this pact. Whatever it has been, there it still is. He could, for example, immediately alert our armed defense and summon Congress to its own swift constitutional decision. His immediate action, like his power and his responsibility, would depend upon the nature and circumstances of the event. So long as his action "forthwith" honorably recognized the basic obligation, he certainly would not be under compulsion to take any impetuous decision which might handicap or damage the sustained strategy ultimately necessary to the pledged objective, namely, the restoration of over-all security for the North Atlantic area.

The committe report answers an even more specific question on this score. Would he, the President, or Congress, be obligated to react to an attack on Paris or Copenhagen in the same precise manner as to an attack on New York? The answer is "No." An armed attack upon our homeland involves an imminent physical need and an imminent constitutional obligation for instant and maximum physical response which does not, and cannot, by the very nature of the case, exist elsewhere, or under other circumstances. Turn the example around. In the event of an armed attack upon Alaska, would we, or could we, expect France or Denmark to react in the same manner as to an attack upon Paris or Copenhagen? Certainly not; obviously not. It would be impossible.

But that does not dilute the "forthwith" pledge of "all for one and one for all" if an international assassin strikes. The pledge dependably means that whoever is attacked will have dependable allies who will do their dependable part, by constitutional process, as swiftly as possible to defeat the aggresors by whatever means each deems necessary.

I hope, Mr. President, that in this phase of the discussion we shall not become so engrossed in procedural hypotheses—although I do not for an instant minimize their importance—that we forget the overriding thesis to which this treaty is addressed. I repeat it again. Our thesis is that this treaty is the surest way to prevent the necessity of having to confront any of these disturbing contingencies because it is the surest way to stop aggression and war before they start in the North Atlantic area. Every precedent and all logic support this thesis. Let us not make the fatal error of deserting the treaty because of our preoccupation with contingencies which we are far more likely to confront without the treaty than with it. The prevention of the next war is more important even than the winning of it because not even the winner will be able to afford his victory.

DISARMAMENT

This leads me to one more observation in this connection. The prevention of war is humankind's supreme objective. The way must be found. Like the United Nations to which it is subordinate, the North Atlantic Pact strives toward this goal. Yet, until the goal is reached, the pact must reluctantly but realistically face the existence of arms and armaments in the hands of potential foes. Peace will never escape this final hazard until universal disarmament, under absolutely dependable and automatic guaranties against bad faith, has spiked all guns for keeps. This is the supreme Christian aspiration. I proudly remind the Senate that Senate Resolution 239, which was the clear forerunner of this pact, asked not only for the pact, but also, and with equal emphasis, for maximum American efforts "to obtain agreements" among United Nations members, "upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation."

The same Senate which asked, in Senate Resolution 239, for collective self-defense under article 51 of the Charter—as envisioned in the pending treaty—also asked, and in the same breath, for universal dis-

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armament. Let that stand. Mr. President, as an incontestable answer to those malignant critics who cry out that the North Atlantic Pact is born of warmongers harboring evil, armed designs upon their fellow men.

I could wish, Mr. President, that if and when this pact is ratified, the President of the United States might address the world upon this score. I could wish that he might remind the world of all six of the objectives of Senate Resolution 239 from which this pact springs; and that he might call the peoples of the earth to a new crusade in behalf of these peace truths in the so-called Vandenberg Resolution. I could wish that he might underscore our good-faith dedication, and plead for good-faith recruits.

It is peace which dominates our souls. Peace and righteousness—the only kind of peace that is worth the price we are prepared to pay for it.

I could also wish, sir, that the President of the United States might thus recite Senate Resolution 239 for another reason. The same Senate which thus asked for a "collective arrangement" to implement article 51, pursuant to the terms of the pending treaty, also asked, and in the same breath, for new strengths in the United Nations Charter. Let that stand as the equally incontestable answer to those melancholy critics who insist that the North Atlantic Pact is born of a purpose to defile, if not scuttle, the United Nations.

I am conscious that this anxiety honestly possesses many earnest friends of the United Nations. I prayerfully say to them that I am certain they are wrong. The pact is written strictly within the framework of the Charter. It implements the Charter pursuant to the Charter's own authority and direction. It categorically asserts in article 7 that "this treaty does not affect in any way the obligations under the Charter of the parties which are members of the United Nations." It categorically asserts that the treaty does not affect "the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security."

Nor does it. I say again that this pact goes into final active operation only when the Charter itself is not operating. The pact ceases to operate whenever the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. In net result, the pact never operates if the Security Council always operates. If there is a lapse, the Charter clearly and explicitly tells its member nations to do precisely what the pact defines.

The inherent right of collective defense—those are Charter words—clearly includes the inherent right of collective preparation for defense. But there is neither preparation nor ultimate action against anything, Mr. President, unless an armed aggressor rapes the Charter, and then only until the Charter's principles and purposes are redeemed. How can such defense of the Charter possibly be construed as hostile to the Charter? How can it hurt the Charter to make the Charter work?

CHARTER

We are members of the Charter. If the Charter had not been nullified in vital ways by the Communist group, we would already be doing everything, against armed aggression, which we would do under the regional pact. Our obligation under the pact is nothing new. It exists in the whole spirit of the Charter. How can it be possible that we undermine the Charter when we keep its obligation alive—when we keep its spirit alive—by acts of new and effective allegiance?

No, Mr. President; I venture to say that the United Nations and its principles and purposes have no sturdier, no more militant friends than those who here join forces to sustain righteous peace through the North Atlantic Treaty as a supplement to the Charter, not a substitute, pending the happier days when we can expand the sufficiency of the United Nations as our total peace reliance in a saner world.

Mr. President, I shall now briefly, but I hope firmly, deal with other interpretative issues that have arisen in the course of the committee's hearings and the public discussion of the pact. These hearings and this discussion have been useful. We dare leave no twilight zones of fuzzy understanding in respect to what we here do—not only for our own sakes, but also lest there be those among our friends abroad who might one day accuse us of keeping the word of promise to the ear and breaking it to the hope. Regard-

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less of whether we find ourselves in final agreement, I commend the vigilant and critical scrutiny which the distinguished Senator from Missouri [Mr. DONNELL] and the distinguished Senator from Utah [Mr. WATKINS] have focused upon the pact throughout its consideration. I also commend to all Senators the careful and comprehensive report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which speaks with recognized authority and with controlling probity in respect to implications and interpretations.

The question arises whether articles 4 and 5 of the pact cover armed aggression against colonial or dependent or otherwise related areas of the signatories outside the area of the North Atlantic community as geographically defined in article 6. My own understanding is clear and unequivocal. The answer is "No." There can be no other logical answer. The doubts seem to have arisen because article 4, relating solely to consultations, is unlimited in the circumference of these consultations. But there is not a word of obligation in it except to talk things over.

The obligations are spelled out in articles 3 and 5. It is significant, in this connection, that when article 9 establishes a council to implement the treaty, it directs the council's attention specifically to articles 3 and 5. It omits article 4 in this connection. This is as it should be. It is significant design. Our pledge of action under the United Nations Charter is general. That pledge is four years old. Nothing we do here can change it. But our pledge of action under the North Atlantic Pact is limited and specific. It applies only to armed aggression in the area clearly defined in article 6 which is the North Atlantic community, set up by metes and bounds.

A corollary question asks how nonmembers of the United Nations, namely Italy and Portugal, can be included in a United Nations arrangement and in collective security under article 51 of the Charter. The first answer is that article 51 is not the source of the right of individual and collective self-defense. It does not establish this right; it merely recognizes its sovereign existence in all states whether in or out of the United Nations. The second answer is that the Charter of the United Nations clearly calls for collaboration with nonmember states whenever mutual interest requires. Indeed, article 2, paragraph 6, specifically asserts that "the organization shall insure that states not members of the United Nations act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security." This doctrine is basic. It came to San Francisco from Dumbarton Oaks. It is perfectly clear that this article deals with aggression against any state whether a member of the United Nations or not.

Other provisions of the Charter similarly recognize the need to permit non-member states to participate to some extent in the United Nations system for maintaining peace and security. If this were not so I doubt whether Israel would now be an independent nation and now a member of the United Nations. If this were not so, certainly Switzerland would not now be a member of the World Court. The Charter does not prohibit member states from entering into mutual defense treaties with nonmember states. On the contrary, it contemplates just such arrangements by requiring that they be consistent with the Charter.

NON-MEMBERS

Italy and Portugal have sought membership in the United Nations and have been prohibited by veto. Italy is historically indispensable to the individual and collective self-defense of France. Portugal is obviously indispensable to the defense of the North Atlantic community. Portugal may lack our sense of democracy, but it lacks no devotion to our sense of peace as proven through the years. Both adhere to the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter through adherence to this pact.

Two other questions arise in this connection. I respond to both.

First. How can we rearm Italy under article 3 of the pact when our peace treaty with Italy puts a sharp limitation upon Italy's armaments? The answer is that we have no purpose to rearm Italy in excess of treaty limitations. Through self-help and mutual aid we shall increase the efficiency of this brave, young Italian Republic to resist armed aggression within treaty limitations.

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Second. Can other nonmember European states be admitted to the North Atlantic community hereafter? Under article 10, the answer is "Yes," but only by unanimous consent of the existing signatories. Who gives this consent for the United States? The Secretary of State has quoted the President, categorically and unequivocally, that he will do so only with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Secretary of State has further asserted that this pledge is binding upon the present President's successors. In my opinion any Presidential successor who might do otherwise would be impeached. This is fundamental. The character of this pact and the nature and extent of our obligations under it are governed by the character and the nature and the extent of its membership. When we ratify this pact we accept its existing membership and none other. When we ratify this pact that is all we shall have ratified. To enlarge the membership is basically to alter the pact. This must require the consent of the Senate just as definitely in the second instance as in the first. The record is clear and unmistakable.

Still another question really answers itself at this point. What happens if one of the existing signatories itself fundamentally changes character within the textual life of the pact? What happens, for example, if one of them succumbs to communism? Are we still bound by these pledges? The answer is that we are not. Any adverse change in basic character would represent a new signatory to all intents and purposes. We are making no commitments to any such new signatories.

But how do we expel them? We do not. Under such circumstance the pact simply ceases to be operative in respect to them. They expel themselves in reality by erasing their own eligibility under the terms of the pact. Cooperation would be impossible from their point of view or from ours. These facts would mutually serve to terminate the actual relationship.

Are we bound to support a member state against internal attack which seeks to overthrow the government? We are not bound, directly or indirectly, to take sides in civil wars. We are pledged only against armed aggression by one state against another. If civil war should include external armed aggression, identified by us as such, we would be obligated to take such steps against the external armed aggression as we would deem necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. But this treaty is not a contract for the perpetuation of the internal status quo and cannot be used as such any more than can its parent, the United Nations Charter, which under article 2, paragraph 7, is prohibited from intervening in matters which are essentially within domestic jurisdiction.

Many questions have been asked about the general engagements in article 2, the "further development of peaceful and friendly international relations" and particularly the quest for the elimination of conflict in international relations and the encouragement of economic collaboration. This is simply a restatement of the general philosophy of self-help and mutual aid which underlies every international enterprise upon which we have embarked. It simply reemphasizes our constant theme that needless economic conflict is a barrier to progressive stabilities. I should say it is particularly addressed to the need for larger Western European unities.

ARTICLE 2

Under it, do we accept any tariff commitments? We do not. Does it obligate us in any way, for example, in respect to the pending I.T.O., the International Trade Organization? It does not. Does it leave us free to consult our own economic necessities as we believe them to be? It does. It is a general expression of economic good will, along with its other emphasis upon mutually promoting free institutions and conditions of stability and well-being. It is a broad assertion, like the preamble, of an ideology. It is an abstract objective in keeping with the spirit of cooperation in the North Atlantic community. It is not by any stretch of the imagination a mandate.

This leads to yet another frequent query. By this pact do we tacitly exclude from our concern those nations which we do not include in the community? We do not. Our engagements to all member states in the United Nations remain specifically unimpaired. No jot or tittle is subtracted. Specific proofs of this truth abound. For example, the Rio pact remains impregnably intact, and always will.

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That includes more member states than does this treaty. Again, we are concurrently demonstrating that our direct concern with Greece and Turkey and with Western Germany and with Korea and with kindred trouble spots is just as acute today as it was before the Senate ever thought of its resolution 239, which started this pact upon its way. The resolution sought, among other things, the strengthening of the United Nations as a vital whole. Under its directive we are today seeking this United Nations strength just as vigorously in the General Assembly and in the Security Council as we are seeking new strength for it through regional facilities to help it meet its responsibility for peace and security in the world.

We are not, by this pact, dedicating ourselves to a priority bloc. We are not subdividing our allegiance to the whole United Nations, any more than we did at Rio. We are preparing, through congenial cooperation, to meet our existing obligations imposed upon us by the Charter, in that community where our responsibilities to the Charter are calculated to be most intimate and most direct. Surely we thus serve and strengthen the whole institution and every peace-loving state within it.

With confident approval I quote Ambassador Warren Austin, our former honored colleague, who has been and still is our principal representative in the United Nations. Said he, in our hearings:

> If the North Atlantic Treaty is operated according to the letter and the spirit of the Charter and the treaty, it can lift the cause of peace above any level yet attained.

He strongly recommends that we vote "Yes." I venture to suggest that his devoted loyalty to the United Nations is ample reliance in resolving any doubts that any of us may have in respect to the impact of this treaty upon the institution to which he gives his life and love.

One final point, Mr. President. It is a legitimate source of widespread anxiety that we shall not overstrain our own resources in any of these commitments lest we ourselves collapse, pursuant to Soviet prayers, and take the peace hopes of the world down with us. Unquestionably we confront fiscal limitations which we dare not ignore. We must be provident. Yet, even in the matter of prudence, it is the fact of life that "without vision the people perish."

The surest way—the only largely effective way—for us to cut our budgets in the years to come is to find a dependable formula for peace. Exactly one-half of our budget for the next fiscal year is required for national security through defense and foreign aid. This percentage is continuously geared to the progress we can make toward peace. It inevitably and unavoidably reflects the degree of menace we confront. One dare not even think what it would be in the event of another war. We truly spend to save—taxes as well as lives and liberties—when we invest in peace. This is not an easy equation to evaluate in the midst of these uncertain economic days. But let realists remember, when they strike their balance, that short-sighted economy can be as costly and as deadly as rash extravagance under some circumstances.

SUMMARY

Now Mr. President, I summarize; and I leave my colleagues to their fateful judgments. This is my estimate of the total situation we here face.

When the Senate, by a vote of 64 to 4 on June 11, 1948, adopted Senate Resolution 239, I believe it proposed the wisest and the safest peace procedures available to us and to western civilization.

It advised the President of the United States to strive toward strengthening the sinews of the United Nations in behalf of the collective peace and fellowship to which we rededicated our hearts and hopes. In particular, we advised him to seek regional and collective arrangements and to associate with them, in behalf of individual and collective self-defense through self-help and mutual aid against armed aggression.

The country well-nigh universally approved the Senate's action at that time. The percentage of dissent on the outside was apparently as small as it was on the inside.

The President has acted upon the Senate's all but unanimous advice. He has sent us precisely that for which we asked—and in the tailoring of which we have had a constant hand. Indeed, I would not know what it was I was asking for on that historic day last

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June if this pact is not it. Furthermore, the need has not lessened with the intervening months, nor have the signs that this increased and final unity in the North Atlantic community will strongly maintain the peace momentum, in this area, which has been making such vivid strides against its obvious adversaries.

I earnestly submit that this is no time to let this peace momentum lag or lapse. Let us maintain this sanctuary of realistic hope. This is no time to let the relatively little risks, if such there be, blind us to the larger risks which we here mitigate and which can involve the very survival of free society. Let us not get so close to the trees that we lose sight of the forest. While we must frankly assess the liabilities, lest we dream ourselves and others into delusions, let us just as frankly assess the supreme and potent and, I believe, dominant advantages which destiny here invites us to embrace for the sake of our own national security in our own precious land.

This pact is a fraternity of peace. It involves us in no obligation not already implicit in our signature to the United Nations Charter. It simply makes the obligation plain and dependable for us and others. It binds potential and indispensable allies to us as well as us to them. It spells it out. This candor can be as powerful as an atomic bomb. This is its terrific authority for peace. It spells out, beyond any shadow of any doubt, the conclusive warning that 300,000,000 people, united in competent self-defense, will never allow an armed aggressor to divide and conquer them pursuant to the pattern of the rapes of yesterday. It spells out the conclusive warning that independent freedom is not an orphan in this western world, and that no armed aggression will have a chance to win.

Thus we crystallize the most practical deterrent and discouragement to war which the wit of man has yet devised.

We have done our best—for peace. But we recognize our frailty. The wit of man alone is not enough. I quote the final sentence from the findings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:

> In tendering this unanimous report on the North Atlantic Treaty, we do so in furtherance of our Nation's most precious heritage—shared in common with the other signatories—continuing faith in our dependence upon Almighty God and His guidance in the affairs of men and nations.

[Applause, Senators rising.]

. . . . . .

Mr. TAFT, Republican, Ohio. It is with great regret that I have come to my conclusion, but I have come to it because I think the pact carries with it an obligation to assist in arming, at our expense, the nations of Western Europe, because with that obligation I believe it will promote war in the world rather than peace, and because I think that with the arms plan it is wholly contrary to the spirit of the obligations we assumed in the United Nations Charter. I would vote for the pact if a reservation were adopted denying any legal or moral obligation to provide arms.

The purpose of American foreign policy, as I see it, is to maintain the freedom of the people of this country and, insofar as consistent with that purpose, to keep this country at peace. We are, of course, interested in the welfare of the rest of the world because we are a humane nation. But our huge economic aid however is based more on the belief that a world which is prosperous and well off is less likely to engage in war than one in which there are great inequalities in the economic condition of different people.

In the past, we have considered that the best method of preserving the peace and security of this country is the maintenance of American armed forces sufficient to defend us against attack, and a wise diplomatic policy which does not antagonize other nations. Those still are the main essentials to the maintenance of peace in the world of today.

But as the world shrinks in size, as new weapons are developed, as we inevitably become more involved in the affairs of other countries, it has become apparent that these weapons alone will not assure peace. And so we have committed ourselves to the principle of an association of sovereign nations banded together to preserve peace by preventing and punishing aggression. In the United Nations Charter we accepted the principle that we would go to war in association with other

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nations against a nation found by the Security Council to be an aggressor. That was a tremendous departure from our previous policy, but one which I have always urged and approved from the days of the League of Nations. I believe that all nations must ultimately agree, if we are to have peace, to an international law defining the duties and obligations of such nations, particularly with reference to restraint from aggression and war. I believe that there should be international courts to determine whether nations are abiding by that law, and I believe that there should be a joint armed force to enforce that law and the decisions of that court. I believe that in the end, the public opinion of the world will come to support the principle that nations like individuals are bound by law, and will insist that any nation which violates the law be promptly subjected to the joint action of nations guided by a determination to enforce the laws of peace.

IDEALS

It is quite true that the United Nations Charter as drafted does not as yet reach the ideals of international peace and justice which I have described, but it goes a long way in that direction. It is defective principally because any one of the large nations can veto the action of the Security Council, and because there is not sufficient emphasis on law and justice as a guide to the action of the Security Council. But we have advised the President that prompt action should be taken to improve the Charter. Senate Resolution No. 239, adopted by the Senate on May 19, 1948, contained three clauses proposing improvement in the United Nations Charter: First, a voluntary agreement to remove the veto from many questions; second, maximum efforts to obtain agreement for a United Nations armed force and the reduction of national armaments; and third, a review of the Charter by a general conference called under article 109 of the Charter. As far as I know, the State Department has disregarded these injunctions of Senate Resolution 239 and concentrated only on that clause of the resolution which proposed a compact under article 51, based on the defects of the United Nations Charter.

The distinguished Senator from Michigan has called the attention of the Senator from Iowa [Mr. GILLETTE] to the fact that this is not a true statement, that the State Department has urged these changes on the United Nations. I can only say that both the Senator from Iowa and myself do follow the newspapers, and that if they have so urged, no emphasis has been placed upon the matter. There has been no effort to stir up public opinion in favor of such changes, as there has been in favor of the Atlantic Pact. So far as I know, no suggestion whatever has been made that any conference be called under article 109 of the Charter, which I think would be the only effective means of securing improvements in the Charter.

The North Atlantic Treaty might have been so drafted as to create a small United Nations within the larger group, improving upon the United Nations Charter, eliminating its defects, and furnishing an example of an improved international organization which could be followed by the United Nations itself. It might have established a law between the nations signing it and a force to prevent aggression between those nations without veto and with reliance on the decision of a competent court to administer justice. This was suggested by Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong in an article in *Foreign Affairs* in October, 1948. It is the general plan suggested in Senate Resolution 133, introduced by the distinguished junior Senator from Alabama and ten other Senators on Friday of last week, with which I have great sympathy.

. . . . . .

What is the nature of that treaty?

It is obviously, and I do not think it can be questioned, a defensive military alliance between certain nations, the essence of which is an obligation under article 5 to go to war if necessary with any nation which attacks any one of the signers of the treaty. Such an attack may come from outsiders or it may come from one of the signers of the treaty itself. The obligation is completely binding for a period of 20 years. It imposes an obligation upon the United States to each member nation whether or not there is consultation or joint action by the Council, or a finding by any court that an unjustified armed attack has occurred. Our obligation

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is self-executing upon the occurrence of an armed attack.

Some doubt will always remain as to whether the Congress must declare war before our armed forces actually take part. I am inclined to think such action is not necessary if the President chooses to use our armed forces when an ally is attacked. But whether it is or not, the obligation to go to war seems to me binding upon the United States as a nation, so that Congress would be obligated to declare war if that were necessary to comply with the provisions of the treaty. It is pointed out that the President could fail to act and Congress could refuse to declare war, but certainly we are not making a treaty on the theory that we expect to violate it in accordance with our own sweet will.

OBLIGATIONS

It is correctly pointed out that the exact measures which we are obligated to take will be determined by us, and that it may not be necessary to go to the extent of a declaration of war. We do reserve a certain discretion, but as I see it, we do not reserve any discretion on the question, for instance, whether the armed attack is justified, as a reason for supporting it. If one of the members of the pact provokes an attack, even by conduct which we disapprove, we would still apparently be bound to go to its defense. By executing a treaty of this kind, we put ourselves at the mercy of the foreign policies of 11 other nations, and do so for a period of 20 years. The Charter is obviously aimed at possible Russian aggression against Western Europe, but the obligation assumed is far broader than that. I emphasize again that the obligation is much more unconditional, much less dependent on legal processes and much less dependent on joint action than the obligation of the United Nations Charter.

And yet in spite of these dangers, I have wanted to vote in favor of the Atlantic Pact for one reason and would still do so if the question of arms were not involved. I fully agree with the effective argument in favor of the pact made by the distinguished Senator from Michigan because of its warning to the U. S. S. R. I think we should make it clear to the U. S. S. R. that if it attacks Western Europe, it will be at war with us. I fully agree with the statement of the distinguished Senator from Michigan:

> It is not the military forces in being which measure the impact of this knock-out admonition. Its invincible power for peace is the awesome fact that any aggressor upon the North Atlantic community knows in advance from the very moment he launches his conquest, he will forthwith face whatever cumulative opposition these united allies in their own wisdom deem necessary to beat him to his knees and to restore peace and security. It is this total concept which, in my view, would give even a reincarnated Hitler pause.

I agree that if the Kaiser had known that England and the United States would be in the war, the First World War might never have begun. I agree that if Hitler had known the United States would be in the war, the Second World War might not have begun. I favor the extension of the Monroe Doctrine under present circumstances to Western Europe.

It is said that the Atlantic Treaty is simply another Monroe Doctrine. I wish it were. That would be much more acceptable to me than the Atlantic Pact, arms or no arms. Let me point out the vital differences. The Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral declaration. We were free to modify it or withdraw from it at any moment. This treaty, adopted to deal with a particular emergency today, is binding upon us for 20 years to cover all kinds of circumstances which cannot possibly be foreseen. The Monroe Doctrine left us free to determine the merits of each dispute which might arise and to judge the justice and the wisdom of war in the light of the circumstances at the time. The present treaty obligates us to go to war if certain facts occur. The Monroe Doctrine imposed no obligation whatever to assist any American nation by giving it arms or even economic aid. We were free to fight the war in such a manner as we might determine, or not at all. This treaty imposes on us a continuous obligation for 20 years to give aid to all the other members of the pact, and, I believe, to give military aid to all the other members of the pact.

All kinds of circumstances may arise which will make our obligation most inconvenient.

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The government of one of these nations may be taken over by the Communist Party of that nation. The distinguished Senator from Michigan says that we are then released from our obligation, but I see no basis whatever for such a conclusion. If that were true of a Communist government, it might also be true of a Socialist government if we did not happen to approve of socialism at the time. Presumably, it could be true of a Fascist government, one similar, perhaps, to that existing in Spain which has been denounced recently by the Secretary of State, and which is not very different from the dictatorship of Portugal, which is a member of the pact and which has not a truly democratic form of government.

I cannot find anything in this treaty which releases us because we do not happen to like the officials at the particular moment.

Obviously, any help we give one of these nations today may be used later for aggressive purposes, against Russia or its satellites, or neutrals, or members of the pact, or it may even be used against us when we try to fulfill our obligation to other members of the pact. Except for the warning conveyed to Soviet Russia, this treaty does not bear the slightest resemblance to the Monroe Doctrine.

It is said that the treaty is in strict accordance with Senate Resolution 239 adopted by the Senate in May, 1948. I did not vote upon that resolution, but I believe this treaty goes far beyond the advice there given by the Senate. That resolution approved the general theory of a treaty to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense in case of an armed attack in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter, but I do not think it suggested the providing of arms to members of the pact, or even the obligations of article 5. Paragraph 4 of the resolution, which is the closest one to authorizing the present treaty, sounds more like a new Monroe Doctrine than it does like a treaty. It does not refer to a treaty of any kind. It says that one of our objectives should be contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear our determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting our national security. This looks far more like a warning to Russia than it does like a defensive military alliance of the present type. The distinguished Senator from Michigan, in explaining the resolution at that time, said:

> It declines automatically military alliances. It declines all peacetime renewals of the old, open-ended lend-lease formula. It declines unilateral responsibility for the fate of Western Europe. It is none of those things. It is the exact opposite.

The present treaty is a military alliance. The present treaty does contemplate a peacetime renewal of the old, open-ended lend-lease formula. The present treaty assumes unilateral responsibility for the fate of Western Europe. We are obligated to go to the defense of any nation whether the other members of the pact do so or not, or whatever their consultation may advise.

THE RIO TREATY

It is also suggested that the pact is modeled upon the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance known as the Rio Treaty, entered into September 2, 1947. There are substantial differences, however, in these two treaties. In the first place, the obligation in the Rio Pact in case of armed attack is only to assist in meeting the attack. Under the Atlantic Pact, we are bound to assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith such action as is deemed necessary, including the use of armed forces. Secondly, the action to be taken in the event of an armed attack is far more subject to the consultative action of the states than in the case of the Atlantic Treaty. If any state is attacked, the matter is referred to the organ of consultation established by the pact, and any state would be justifed in waiting until such organ acts. Furthermore, there is no suggestion of the providing of arms or financial aid to other members of that treaty.

There is one other material difference. In the Rio Pact, we assume an obligation which, I believe, we are perfectly capable of performing. In the Atlantic Treaty, it is extremely doubtful whether under any circumstances we can carry out our obligation to countries like Norway, Denmark, and Italy. I do not like to promise to do things which it is impossible for us to carry out.

Mr. McMAHON, Democrat, Connecticut. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

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Mr. TAFT. I yield to the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. McMAHON. Does the Senator feel, by giving that opinion, that if Norway or any other of the Scandinavian countries, or Italy, were invaded, it would be a matter we should take lightly instead of very seriously, by the use of everything we have?

Mr. TAFT. Oh, no. I am perfectly willing to go to their assistance. I simply say that the prospect of American troops being able to defend Norway or Denmark against invasion by Russia is very remote. I think it would be impossible. Of course I am not a military expert, but Norway has 100 miles of open frontier with Russia, and, in my opinion, American troops would not arrive there in time to stop several million Russians if they wanted to go through into Norway. Our action would have to be simply a defensive action of some kind, perhaps interference with the Russian advance from the east, or some such action. However, I do not purport to know. There are no troops in Italy. The Italians cannot maintain an army. I cannot quite see how we could get an army there in time to defend them and perform the obligation which we apparently are thought to have assumed, to defend the frontiers of those countries.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. TAFT. I yield.

Mr. McMAHON. As I take it, the Senator is pointing out the difficulties of our doing anything about it if Italy and the Scandinavian countries are invaded. As I understand the Senator, notwithstanding those difficulties—and the Senator has talked about actions from the air—I take it the Senator is fully in agreement with the statement that if the event I have discussed should come to pass, it should be of immediate concern to the United States, and that, above all, we should immediately take it upon ourselves, if not to maintain the borders, at least to slow down the advance.

Mr. TAFT. I am in favor of the extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Western Europe.

Mr. McMAHON. And that includes Scandinavia?

Mr. TAFT. That includes Norway and Denmark and Italy. I am perfectly willing to assume that obligation. But that is a very different thing from what we would agree to do in this treaty, as I shall discuss later.

Mr. TYDINGS. Democrat, Maryland. Mr. President, will the Senator from Ohio yield.

Mr. TAFT. I yield to the Senator from Maryland.

Mr. TYDINGS. I have listened very attentively to the points of view which the able Senator from Ohio has offered, and I can see that there would be ample ground for one to take a viewpoint different from that of many other Members of the Senate. But I am somewhat in a quandary on one particular phase of the difference.

The Senator says that he would support, not with great enthusiasm, but with reluctance, the treaty if it were understood that the furnishing of arms from this country to certain countries of Europe was not to follow as a result of the pact. With that point of view I am not in agreement, but I can understand that position. What I cannot understand is, however, if the Senator would support the pact—as a pact—if he were sure arms would not be sent, why he is attacking the pact—as a pact—if arms are to be sent.

Mr. TAFT. I do think we have to balance the advantages and the disadvantages. I think the advantage of a Monroe Doctrine declaration is very great, and if we were not going to arm the world and promise to do something we cannot do, and therefore do not really intend to do, I think I would go along. In fact, I am sure I would, if I thought this were not a defensive military alliance, with the obligation to arm half the world in connection with the pact. That is a question which I really desire to discuss. That is what has given me the greatest trouble.

Mr. TYDINGS. I do not wish to delay the Senator, but I should like to re-emphasize what he has already said, that as I understand, if it were not for the arms feature in the offing, the Senator would not be making an argument against the pact, but would support it.

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Mr. TAFT. No, I would still make the argument against it, because I think it should be pointed out. If it were simply a Monroe Doctrine—

Mr. TYDINGS. The Senator would support it?

Mr. TAFT. I would support the pact, in spite of its disadvantages, because of the Monroe Doctrine effect which I think it would have, which is of great importance at the present moment, because I think that without arms that would be an effective weapon to preserve peace at a crucial time. With arms I think it is an incitation to war.

Mr. TYDINGS. Then, as I understand the Senator's position, it is a question of balance. We all see certain disadvantages in the treaty, as well as advantages, but on balance the Senator would support the treaty if it were not for the fact of the arms implications which flow from it.

Mr. TAFT. That is correct. And yet, in spite of my belief that the treaty goes much too far and should have been confined to a mere declaration on our part that we would go to war if Russia attacked Western Europe, I would still vote for the treaty except for my belief that the pact commits us to the arming of all the other signers of the pact. There is no question that the arms program and the treaty were negotiated together. There is no question in my mind that foreign nations which signed the treaty regarded the providing of arms as an essential part of it. Several of their leaders have expressed that view in public in Europe.

I quote from Mr. C. L. Sulzberger's recent article in the *New York Times,* quoting the Danish Premier:

> We cannot help but feel somewhat disappointed about the fact that this has not yet been provided for and the fact that we do not yet know when it is coming. Of course, I myself and my Cabinet colleagues understood the delaying factors in the United States Congress, but it is difficult to explain this to the people.

. . . . . .

The French government issued a statement which indicated very clearly their view also, that arms were a necessary accompaniment of the pact.

Mr. Arthur Krock, who is usually well advised, stated:

> The State Department might have held the spotlight on the treaty alone by different tactics. But any Member of Congress who reads informed newspaper dispatches must have known, from the time the Scandinavian ministers were encouraged by the Department to confer here, that the purpose of their visit was to get arms; and that the hope of getting these arms under the North Atlantic Pact was what impelled the Norwegians to reject the Swedish offer of a separate Scandinavian alliance.

We cannot keep our obligations under the pact, in my opinion, unless we provide arms. Certainly I do not desire to assume an obligation and then be charged with going back on it.

If we ratify the pact and fail to furnish the military aid, I believe we will at once be accused of repudiation, and the pact will be completely discredited. Our allies will say with force and logic, "Why was article 3 put in the treaty if it doesn't mean military aid?"

I realize that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations says:

> The State Department has assured the committee that during the negotiations no commitments of any kind were made by the United States to furnish military assistance. The European negotiators were constantly reminded that the implementation of article 3 by the United States would depend upon congressional action. While they were told that the administration intended to introduce legislation authorizing the transfer of military equipment, at the same time they were repeatedly warned that no assurances whatever could be given as to whether or not, in what form or in what amounts, such legislation would be approved.

Note, however, that neither the State Department nor the committee argues that article 3 does not mean military assistance. All the State Department did was to warn Europeans that Congress might not provide it in spite of the treaty.

The State Department position seems to me very clearly stated in the White Paper issued on the United States military assistance program, which I think is in Friday's RECORD, in which the Department said:

> Not until we share our strength on a common defensive front can we hope to replace this temptation (to attack Western Europe) with a real deterrent to war. The North At-

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> lantic Pact is an agreement on the policy of a common defense; its very vital corollary is a program of military aid.

No one can read that document which is set out in Friday's RECORD without concluding that, from the point of view of the Department of State, military aid is an absolutely essential feature of the new treaty. The same white paper says:

> The military assistance program would be necessary even without an Atlantic Pact. It is clear, however, that the military assistance program will be more effective with the Atlantic Pact than without it.

In an effort to dispute this doctrine that the arms are tied into the treaty.

In short, the pact is an adjunct to the arms program rather than the important feature of aid to Western Europe. The Secretary of State himself says:

> The pact does not dictate the conclusion of honest judgment. * * * It does preclude repudiation of the principle or of the obligation of making that honest judgment. * * * There is an obligation to help, but the extent, the manner, and the timing is up to the honest judgment of the parties.

But, if his words are read clearly, the point is that he regards us as bound to furnish military aid. We may determine its extent. We may hem and haw about how it should be limited. But the Secretary, by his own words, it seems to me, admits that the military aid is an essential part of the program.

If article 3 does not mean military aid, what does it mean? I agree that the two questions could be separated, but the fact is that they are not. On Saturday, the distinguished chairman of the committee assured the press that:

> A vote for the treaty does not carry with it any obligation to vote for arms implementation. Each Senator is free to vote his convictions on each one as it comes before the Senate.

I agree that Senators can cast utterly inconsistent votes, and sometimes do. But the distinguished chairman added that we must act promptly on arms implementation to assure cosigners of the pact we mean business, that we are sincere and earnest. In other words, he says that if we vote for the treaty and then vote against the arms proposal, we are insincere and do not mean what we say.

The distinguished Senator from Michigan takes the position that the arming of Europe is not essential to the most important purposes of the pact, and I entirely agree with him. Its most effective purpose is entirely independent of the pact. But that is not the position of the Department of State or the committee, and their words of reassurance are contradicted by the terms of the treaty, the circumstances of its negotiation, and their own words.

I think that is the general conclusion of the newspapers of the country. This morning an editorial was published in the *Washington Post,* from which I read in part as follows:

> By contrast an honest stand was taken by Secretary Acheson in his appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee. "If you ratify the pact," he said, "it cannot be said there is no obligation to help. There is an obligation to help, but the extent, the manner, and the timing are up to the honest judgment of the parties." To be sure, there is no express obligation, but the armament implications of the pact, in articles 3 and 9, are as plain as the dome on the Capitol and as necessary as its walls.

I now read the concluding sentence of the editorial:

> In the meantime, the indivisibility of the pact and an arms program within this framework needs to be redeclared in the pact debate in answer to the present questionings.

General Bradley, in his testimony before the committee, said very much the same thing. He said:

> Plans for the common defense of the existing free world must provide for the security of Western Europe without abandoning these countries to the terrors of another enemy occupation. Only upon that premise can nations closest to the frontiers be expected to stake their fortunes with ours in the common defense.

In other words, only because of the arms program could these nations have been expected to sign the Atlantic Pact. That is the position of General Bradley, who was in the negotiations throughout, and who was somewhat franker than the distinguished diplomats who have dealt with the subject.

I have come reluctantly to the conclusion, therefore, that the arms program now presented to Congress must be considered an integral part of the Atlantic Treaty.

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If that is the fact, we have a very different problem from the one which is urged upon us by the Committee on Foreign Relations, by its distinguished chairman, by the State Department, and by the distinguished Senator from Michigan.

First. With the arms in the pact it is even more clear that the pact is a military alliance, a treaty by which one nation undertakes to arm half the world against the other half, and in which all the pact members agree to go to war if one is attacked. It cannot be described otherwise than a military alliance. Of course, it is not like some of the alliances in the past, although many of them, such as the Franco-British Alliance prior to World War I, were entirely defensive in character, or purported to be. Others were offensive and defensive alliances. I quite agree that the purpose of this alliance is not offensive, and that we have no offensive purpose in mind. But it is exactly like many defensive military alliances of the past.

OFFENSIVE

I was rather amused at General Bradley's effort to distinguished this military alliance from others. He said:

> As I see it, the purpose and meaning of this is entirely different from the normal military alliances as we have known them in years past. Here we are binding ourselves together with some other nations who have free institutions and ideals like our own. Some of the military alliances in the past were a combination of people who did not have such common ideals. Some of them were for purposes of offense, some for defense, that is true.

In other words, the general's argument is that this is not a military alliance because all of its members are virtuous—for the moment.

While this is not an offensive alliance, the line between defense and offense today is indeed a shadowy one. The Maginot Line was the essence of pure defense. Today it is the target of ridicule. Every good defense includes elements of offense. We cannot have an adequate armament for defense which cannot be converted overnight into a weapon of offense. We talked of defense for years before entering World War II while our preparation was really for offense. The result is, that no matter how defensive an alliance may be, if it carries the obligation to arm it means the building up of competitive offensive armament. This treaty, therefore, means inevitably an armament race, and armament races in the past have led to war.

The United Nations looks perhaps vainly to the reduction of armaments. The Atlantic Pact proposes to increase them.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TAFT. I yield.

Mr. McMAHON. Does the Senator from Ohio think that the treaty adds anything to the armaments race which is now going on, and has been going on since 1946?

Mr. TAFT. Yes, I think it reemphasizes it, makes it much more prominent, builds it up into a much more prominent condition than its present condition.

Mr. McMAHON. Does the Senator think that the treaty adds anything to the Russian determination to increase her divisions, her airplanes, her submarines as we know she is doing? Does the Seantor believe that the treaty in any way increases her determination to secure atomic armament in quantity?

Mr. TAFT. That brings up the second objection to which I was just about to address myself.

Second. The pact standing by itself would clearly be a deterrent to war. If Russia knows that if it starts a war it will immediately find itself at war with the United States, it is much less likely to start a war. I see and believe in the full force of that argument. That is why I would favor the extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Europe. But if Russia sees itself ringed about gradually by so-called defensive arms, from Norway and Denmark to Turkey and Greece, it may form a different opinion. It may decide that the arming of Western Europe, regardless of its present purpose, looks to an attack upon Russia. Its view may be unreasonable, and I think it is. But from the Russian standpoint it may not seem unreasonable. They may well decide that if war is the certain result, that war might better occur now rather than after the arming of Europe is completed. In 1941, Secretary Hull sent a message to Japan in the nature of an ultimatum which said, in effect, that if Japan did not withdraw from China, sooner or later

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they would face a war with the United States. The Japanese appear to have concluded that if ultimately there was to be such a war, it was to their interest to have it occur at once.

The arming of Western Europe cannot be achieved overnight—in fact, it will be years before the European nations could resist an all-out Russian attack. During that period, I feel that the arms policy is more likely to incite war than to deter it. The distinguished junior Senator from New York, who has had so much experience in foreign affairs, said on March 8:

> While the Soviet government has no present intention of resorting to war as an instrument of national policy, nevertheless, it can be assumed that the Soviet state should use the Red army if its leaders felt that their homeland was imminently and seriously threatened.

And he warned particularly against the bringing of United States military might directly to Russia's Scandinavian border.

Answering the question of the distinguished Senator from Connecticut directly, I think this arms program will very likely force the Russians into an acceleration of their arms program, so that we face an armament race, which in the past has seldom failed ultimately to produce war.

Third. The pact with the arms obligation, I believe, violates our obligations under the United Nations. The pact apparently is not made under articles 52 to 54 inclusive, because we do not propose to consult the Security Council as there contemplated, we do plan to take enforcement action without the authorization of the Security Council, and we do not plan to keep them fully informed. The pact must, therefore, be supported under article 51, which says:

> Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

I would conclude that under this article, member nations can enter into an agreement binding themselves to exercise this inherent right of collective self-defense if and when an armed attack occurs. There is nothing said about an agreement. There is no reference to regional understandings, as there is in articles 52 to 54, but I asume that probably such an agreement could be entered to exercise that right.

It seems clear to me, however, that the right is to be exercised only "if an armed attack occurs." I do not think article 51 extends the actual exercise of this right to the arming of other nations prior to the occurrence of such an attack. An undertaking by the most powerful nation in the world to arm half the world against the other half goes far beyond any "right of collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs." It violates the whole spirit of the United Nations Charter. That charter looks to the reduction of armaments by agreement between individual nations. I do not claim that there is any direct violation of the Charter, but the Atlantic Pact moves in exactly the opposite direction from the purposes of the Charter and makes a farce of further efforts to secure international peace through law and justice. It necessarily divides the world into two armed camps. It may be said that the world is already so divided, but it cannot be said by enforcing that division we are carrying out the spirit of the United Nations.

Fourth. The obligation to furnish arms is either a mere token obligation, or it is one of vast extent. I do not know enough about modern military equipment to make any estimate. I have heard that to provide 60 divisions, which is said to be the very minimum necessary and perhaps completely inadequate against Russian attack, would cost a total of $24 billion. We are entering on a new lend-lease. The history of these obligations has been that once begun, they cannot be easily brought to an end. Furthermore if the Russian threat justifies arms for all of Western Europe, surely it justifies similar arms for Nationalist China, for Indochina, for India, and ultimately for Japan; and in the Near East for Iran, for Syria, and for Iraq. There is no limit to the burden of such a program, or its dangerous implications.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TAFT. I yield.

Mr. TYDINGS. If we found out that Russia was arming other countries outside

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of Russia, would the Senator's position on the arms provisions be the same?

Mr. TAFT. I shall discuss that question later. I do not mind saying now that once we enter into the pact, or do not enter into pact, I am quite willing to consider providing arms for a particular nation to meet a particular emergency. I voted for the Greek and Turkish loans to provide arms. There may be other cases. I think today the providing of arms in support of Nationalist China, where war is actually going on is something that I would approve, but that is a very different thing from building up a tremendous armament for 11 different nations, implying so far as I can see, the obligation to do the same thing in the rest of the world.

In any war the result will not come from the battle put up by the Western European countries. The outcome will finally depend on the armed forces of America. Let us keep our forces strong. Let us use the money we have for armament in building up the American Army, the American Air Forces, and the American Navy. . . .

We have chosen to give economic assistance. That assistance is given on the theory that the Russians do not contemplate aggressive war, but intend to fight their battle by propaganda and a production of chaotic economic conditions. I believe the undertaking of both types of assistance is beyond the economic capacity of the United States. I believe we will have to choose whether we give economic assistance or arms. The first, I believe, has contributed and will contribute to peace. The second, I think, will make war more likely.

Fifth. The justification for the arms aid rests on the necessity of defense against Russia, but remember that once these arms are provided, they are completely within the control of the nation receiving them. They are subject to the orders of those who, at the time, control the government of the country. Those governors may be Communists or Fascists, they may be peace loving, or they may be aggressors. In future years, these arms may be used against us instead of on our side. . . .

It is said that arms given to European countries cannot be used by them in dealing with their colonial possessions outside the scope of the pact, but surely anyone can see that all the armed forces possessed by any country are in one pool and that the bigger that pool is, the more easily they can find arms to undertake action which may be considered aggression in their colonies.

Some years ago our Army officials were obsessed with the idea that we ought to arm the South American nations and send American military missions to each. Since that time, there has been a revolution in South America every two months, on the average. The arms which we might have supplied would have been used in civil war and would have fomented civil war. I have the highest regard for our army officials, but they regard everything in the light of some particular war for which they are preparing, and fail to consider the political changes and the political problems which may arise long before that war occurs, if it ever does.

It is quite true that the economic aid we are giving will be used to build up competition for ourselves, but after all that is in the interest of international trade and, in the long run, we can look after ourselves in that field. But the assistance we give here may be used to bring about the death of American boys and the destruction of American cities.

Sixth. By approving this pact with the arms program, I believe we are committing ourselves to a particular course of action in war which may be unwise at the time when a war may actually develop. It is one thing to agree to go to war with Russia if it attacks Western Europe. It is another to send American ground troops to defend Norway or Denmark or Holland or Italy or even France and England. I cannot assert positively that we are committing ourselves to a particular type of war, but I am inclined to think that we are. Thus, General Bradley testified before the committee:

> Finally, after studied appraisal of the future security provisions for our country, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in unanimous agreement that our strategy, in case we are attacked—

And that means if any member-country is attacked, if we ratify this pact—

> must rely on sufficient integrated forces of land, sea, and air power to carry the war back to the aggressor, ultimately subjugating the sources of his military and industrial power. Plans for the common defense of the existing

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> free world must provide for the security of Western Europe without abandoning these countries to the terrors of another enemy occupation. Only upon that premise can nations closest to the frontiers be expected to stake their fortunes with ours in the common defense.

This appears to contemplate a land war with Russia on the continent of Europe. It appears to contemplate an invasion along the lines which Napoleon and Hitler found to be impossible. It asserts clearly that the nations which signed this pact expect us to send American troops to defend their frontiers.

If this is their expectation, I think we are promising something we cannot do, as I said earlier. I see no way in which we could defend Italy, for it is not even permitted to have an army of its own. The defense of Norway and Denmark would probably be impossible and, if we are bound to do it, may result in the loss of thousands of American lives. It may be that we should conduct a war on the continent of Europe, even though it involves again the sending of millions of American boys to fight Russians who, on land, will outnumber them four to one. But I do not think we should commit ourselves at the present time to any such program or make any such promise to our allies. We may find, if war ever comes, that our part in the war should be conducted from the air alone. We may find that the occupation of an enemy country is vain and useless if the war can be won otherwise, by the destruction of all of their military potentials. We should not commit ourselves by the ratification of this pact to the military assistance program and the plan of campaign which has apparently been promised the members of the pact.

Seventh. Finally, Mr. President, it is becoming increasingly apparent that England, at least, intends to trade extensively with Russia, and inevitably the same thing will be true of other Western European nations. They have provided airplane engines for Russia, heavy machinery, and other equipment which can aid the Russians' war-making potential. The more we take off their shoulders the burden of providing for their own defense, the more free they will be to ship steel and heavy machinery to the East. As a matter of fact, trade between Eastern and Western Europe has prevailed for thousands of years, and it is going to go on, no matter what we say about it. Of course, the recent agreement between Russia and England is very clear evidence of that fact. We are providing extensive economic assistance. To a large extent, economic assistance and aid for arms will go into the same pot. I do not think that the American people at this time desire to increase the overall aid we are giving to Western Europe with its tremendous burden on the American taxpayer.

Mr. President, since I feel that this pact is inextricably linked with the arms program, and since I believe that, so linked, the program is a threat to the welfare of the people of the United States, I shall vote against the treaty.

I am quite willing to consider the providing of assistance to particular countries, at particular times, if such aid seems at that time a real deterrent to war, and on that principle I voted for aid to Greece and Turkey. But that is a very different thing from an obligation to build up the armed forces of 11 countries, and a commitment on the American taxpayer for 20 years to give continued aid under circumstances of which we have not the slightest conception today. It is a very different thing from arming half the world against the other half.

My conclusion has been reached with the greatest discomfort. When so many disagree with that conclusion, I must admit that I may be completely wrong. I do not claim to be an expert in questions of foreign policy. I would like to be able to vote for a policy that will commit us to war if Russia attacks Western Europe. I would be glad to join in an agreement to occupy Germany indefinitely to guard against a third attack from that quarter. I would waive my other objections to the Atlantic Pact if I did not feel that it was inextricably involved with the arms program. But I cannot escape the logic of the situation as I see it, and therefore I cannot vote for a treaty which, in my opinion, will do far more to bring about a third world war than it will ever maintain the peace of the world.

[Applause, Senators rising.]

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